Wilhelm Canaris was born in Aplerbeck January 1, 1887 in Westphalia, the son of wealthy industrialist Carl Canaris and his wife Auguste (née Popp). Until 1938 Canaris believed that his family was related to the Greek admiral, freedom fighter and politician Constantine Kanaris, which influenced his decision to join the navy. While on a visit to Corfu he was given a portrait of the Greek hero, which he always kept in his office. In 1938, however, research showed that his family was of North Italian descent, originally called Canarisi, and had lived in Germany since the 17th century.His grandfather had converted from Catholicism to Lutheranism. In 1905, aged seventeen, Canaris joined the German Imperial Navy and by the outbreak of World War I was serving on board the SMS Dresden as intelligence officer. This cruiser was the only ship that managed to evade the British Fleet for a prolonged period during the Battle of the Falkland Islands in December 1914, largely due to his excellent deception tactics. Whilst anchored in Cumberland Bay, Robinson Crusoe Island, the Dresden was trapped and forced to scuttle by the British. Most of the crew became prisoners in Chile in March 1915, but Canaris escaped in August 1915, using his fluency in Spanish; with the aid of some German merchants he returned to Germany in October 1917 via, among other countries, Great Britain. He was then given intelligence work and sent to Spain, where he survived a British assassination attempt. Returning to active service, he ended the war as a celebrated U-boat commander from late 1917 in the Mediterranean, credited with eighteen sinkings. By that time he was an enemy on the top of the list of the MI6 secret service in the UK. He spoke English fluently (as well as four other foreign languages) and as a naval officer of the old school, he respected Great Britain's Royal Navy despite the rivalry between the two nations. In 1919 Canaris married Erika Waag, also the child of an industrialist. They had two daughters, Eva and Brigitte. Canaris remained in the military after the war, first as a member of the Freikorps and then as part of the Reichsmarine. He was promoted rapidly, becoming a Captain in 1931, the Executive Officer of the cruiser Berlin and then the Commanding Officer of the battleship Schlesien. At this time, he became involved in intelligence work again. He made a series of contacts with high-ranking German officers, politicians and industrialists for the purpose of creating order in German politics. During his Freikorps period, he was on intimate terms with the people such as Horst von Pflugk-Hartung who were accused of political assassinations of leaders of the left, and was even accused himself, although later acquitted, of being involved in the assassinations and other crimes (such as his alleged involvement in Rosa Luxembourg's "trial"). During the 1930–33 period, Canaris was following a course quite parallel to the one followed by the future Nazi party leaders although never a party member himself. Indirectly, though, he promoted the forces that later became part of the Nazi power structure. After Adolf Hitler's rise to power in 1933, Canaris was made head of the Abwehr, Germany's official military intelligence agency, on January 1, 1935. Later that year, he was promoted to Rear Admiral. During the period 1935–36, he made contacts in Spain to organize a German spy network there, due to his excellent Spanish. He was the moving force behind the decision that sided Germany with Francisco Franco during the Spanish Civil War, despite Hitler's initial hesitation to get involved in such an adventure. In 1937 he was still a supporter of Hitler, considering him to be the only solution against communism and a hope for the national revival of Germany. By 1938, however, he had realised that Hitler's policies and plans would lead Germany to disaster and secretly began to work against the régime. His personal style as a gentleman was incompatible with the thuggish behaviour of most of the Nazi party members. A letter from a Spanish contact of his has been preserved and unambiguously confirms his opposition to the Nazi regime. He tried to hinder Hitler's attempts to absorb Czechoslovakia and advised Franco not to permit German passage through Spain for the purposes of capturing Gibraltar. According to written sources, all of Franco’s arguments on this stance were studied and dictated in detail by Canaris, and that simultaneously, a significant sum of money had been deposited by the British in Swiss accounts for Franco and his generals to further convince them to be neutral. He also became involved in two abortive plots to assassinate Hitler, first in 1938 and again in 1939. His most audacious attempt was in planning, with Ewald von Kleist-Schmenzin, to capture and eliminate Hitler and the entire Nazi party before the invasion of Czechoslovakia. At this particular moment, von Kleist visited Britain secretly and discussed the situation with British MI6 and some high ranking politicians. There, the name of Canaris became widely known as the executive hand of von Kleist in the event of an anti-Nazi plot. The high ranking German military leaders believed that if Hitler invaded Czechoslovakia, or any other country, then Britain would declare war on Germany. MI6 was of the same opinion. However, the British reaction to Hitler's annexation of the Sudetenland was more cautious. At a meeting with Hitler in Munich, British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain, (1869 – November 1940), chose diplomacy over war. Munich was a severe disappointment for Kleist and Canaris. It gave Hitler's international reputation an important boost for two reasons: one, he was able to play the part of a man of reason and compromise; and two, he could boast that his predictions that Great Britain would not respond with war had proven to be correct. There are claims that Canaris, who was extremely shocked by this 'dishonest and stupid decision' (his own words), decided to be cautious and wait for a better time to act against Hitler. In January 1939, Canaris manufactured the "Dutch War Scare", which gripped the British government. By January 23, 1939 the British government received information to the effect that Germany intended to invade the Netherlands in February 1939 with the aim of using Dutch air-fields to launch strategic bombing offensive intended to achieve a "knock-out" blow against Britain by razing British cities to the ground. All this information was false, and it was intended by Canaris to achieve a change in British foreign policy.In this, Canaris was successful, and the "Dutch War Scare" played a major role in causing Chamberlain to make the "continental commitment"in February 1939. Nevertheless, it appears likely that MI6 maintained contact with Canaris even after the Munich Agreement signed on 30 September 1938. When Winston Churchill came to power after the resignation of PM Neville Chamberlein in May 1940, Canaris' hopes were renewed, given the new Prime Minister's strong position against Hitler. In the meantime, Reinhard Heydrich, previously a naval cadet who had served under Canaris and was at the time the Sicherheitsdienst (SD) leader, despite being his protegé, friend and neighbour, became his rival. Presumably, the Canaris posting in Abwehr had the secret approval of the dynamic Heydrich, who preferred him to his predecessor, Commander Pfatz, who was not in line with the Nazi party members. Heydrich wanted a controllable Abwehr and was keeping a close eye on Canaris. Canaris appeared outwardly to side with his friend Heydrich, but only in order to give Abwehr a chance to grow and become a considerable force. In Bassett's account,Canaris was deeply frustrated by a briefing from Hitler before the attack on Poland. During the briefing, he was informed about a series of exterminations that had been ordered and which Canaris was required to take notes on. These notes, the book confirms, were sent to MI6. After the outbreak of war between Germany and Poland, in September 1939, Canaris visited the front and witnessed examples of the war crimes committed by the SS Einsatzgruppen. Among these were the burning of the synagogue in Będzin and how the town's Jewish residents were burned to death. He also received reports from Abwehr agents about many other incidents of mass murder throughout Poland. Canaris kept detailed records of these atrocities in his personal diary which he entrusted to Werner Schrader, one of his subordinates and fellow resistance member. After hearing reports of and witnessing masacres in Poland, Canaris on September 12, 1940 travelled to Hitler's headquarters train, at the time in Upper Silesia, to register his objection to the atrocities; prior to reaching Hitler he encountered General Wilhelm Keitel who he informed: "I have information that mass executions are being planned in Poland, and that members of the Polish nobility and the Roman Catholic bishops and priests have been singled out for extermination." Keitel admonished Canaris to go no further with his protest as the detailed plan of atrocities came directly from Hitler, himself. Shocked by these incidents, Canaris began working more actively, at increasing risk, to overthrow Hitler's régime, although he cooperated with the SD to create a decoy. This made it possible for him to pose as a trusted man for some time. He was promoted to full Admiral in January 1940. With his subordinate Erwin Lahousen, he formed a circle of like-minded Wehrmacht officers, many of whom would be executed or forced to commit suicide after the failure of the July 20 Plot. It has been speculated that there was contact with British intelligence during this time, despite the war between the two countries. It is thought that during the invasion of Russia, Canaris received a detailed report of all the enemy positions that was known only to the British. The head of MI6, Stewart Menzies, who shared Canaris’s strong anti-communist beliefs, praised Canaris’s courage and bravery at the end of the war. Reinhard Heydrich and Heinrich Himmler, however, investigated in detail the sources of Canaris's information on Operation Barbarossa, arriving at the conclusion that there had indeed been contact between him and the British. After 1942, Canaris visited Spain frequently and was probably in contact with British agents from Gibraltar. In 1943, while in occupied France, Canaris is said to have made contact with British agents: he was conducted blindfolded to the Convent of the Nuns of the Passion of our Blessed Lord, 127 Rue de la Santé, where he met the local head of the British Intelligence Services, code name "Jade Amicol", in reality Colonel Claude Olivier. Canaris wanted to know the terms for peace if Germany got rid of Hitler. Churchill's reply, sent to him two weeks later, was simple: "Unconditional surrender". During Heydrich's posting in Prague, a serious incident put him and Canaris in open conflict. A Czech agent — Paul Thümmel — was arrested by Heydrich, but Canaris intervened to save him, claiming he was a double agent actually working for Abwehr.Heydrich suspected that Thümmel was actually Canaris's MI6 contact[citation needed]. Heydrich requested that Canaris put the Abwehr under SD and SS control. Canaris appeared to retreat and handled the situation diplomatically, but there was no immediate effect on the Abwehr for the time being. In fact, Canaris had established another two links with MI6 — one via Zurich, and the other via Spain and Gibraltar. It is also possible that Vatican contacts provided a third route to his British counterparts. Canaris also intervened to save a number of victims of Nazi persecution, including hundreds of Jews.Many such people were given token training as Abwehr "agents" and then issued papers allowing them to leave Germany. One notable person he is said to have assisted was the then Lubavitcher Rebbe in Warsaw, Rabbi Yosef Yitzchok Schneersohn.This has led Chabad Lubavitch to campaign for his recognition as a Righteous Gentile by the Yad VaShem holocaust memorial. The assassination of Reinhard Heydrich in Prague, organized by MI6, was done in part to preserve Canaris in his important position. Colonel Wessel von Freytag-Loringhoven's son Niki, testifying in Munich in 1972 and in recent revelations, reports that Canaris was involved in the foiling of Hitler's plot to kidnap Pope Pius XII.Colonel Freytag-Loringhoven was a subordinate of Canaris, and his son, Niki von Freytag-Loringhoven, reported that within days of the arrest of Benito Mussolini as ordered by King Victor Emmanuel III, the Fuhrer commanded the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (the Third Reich’s Security Headquarters) to retaliate against the Italians via the kidnapping or murder of Pius XII and King Victor Emmanuel. The colonel’s son, Niki Freytag Loringhoven, now 72, recently came forward to reveal new details about the plan, reporting that on July 29 and 30, 1943 his father and Erwin von Lahousen, who were employed in the section of German intelligence dealing mainly with sabotage, attended a meeting in Venice where Canaris informed the Italian General, Cesare Amè, of the plot.General Amè relayed the news which allowed the plot to be foiled.The Italian paper, Avvenire, maintains that the younger Freytag von Loringhoven’s accounts comport with the Von Lahousen’s Nuremberg war crimes trials deposition. The evidence that he was playing a double game grew, and at the insistence of Heinrich Himmler, who had suspected him for a long time, Hitler dismissed Canaris from the Abwehr in February 1944, replacing him with Walter Schellenberg and merging most of the Abwehr with the Sicherheitsdienst (SD). Some weeks later, Canaris was put under house arrest, preventing him from taking part directly in the July 20 Plot, 1944, to assassinate Hitler. However, just after the Stalingrad disaster, Canaris had already planned a 'coup' against the entire Nazi regime in which many Nazi officials would be accused for known crimes, while Hitler would be arrested as an insane person based on his exposure to poison gas in World War I, then imprisoned for life. After the July 20 Plot, Canaris's long-time rival, SS leader Heinrich Himmler discovered that one of the officers involved in the plot, a friend of Canaris' who committed suicide, had kept the plot details in a metal box. The investigations also revealed that a number of other assassination plots (possibly another 10 or 15) had been activated but had failed and were covered up at the last minute. Most people who participated in these plots were people Canaris knew well. In the aftermath of the attempt on Hitler's life, the Gestapo found no direct evidence tieing Canaris to the plot, but his close association to many of the conspirators that were arrested was enough to seal his fate. Himmler kept Canaris alive for some time because he planned to use him secretly as a future contact with the British in order to come to an agreement to end the war with himself as the leader of Germany. Hitler also wanted to keep him alive in order to get the names of additional conspirators. When Himmler's plan failed to materialize, he received the approval of Hitler to send Canaris to an SS drumhead court-martial presided over by Otto Thorbeck with Walter Huppenkothen as prosecutor that sentenced him to death. Together with his deputy General Hans Oster, military jurist General Karl Sack, theologian Rev. Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Ludwig Gehre, Canaris was humiliated before witnesses and then executed on April 9, 1945, in the Flossenburg concentration camp, a few weeks before the end of the war. He was led to the gallows barefoot and naked. At the time of his execution, Canaris had been decorated with the Iron Cross First and Second Class, the Silver German Cross, the Cross of Honour and the Wehrmacht Twelve and Twenty-Five Year Long-Service Ribbons. Erwin von Lahousen and Hans Bernd Gisevius, two of Canaris' main subordinates, survived the war and testified during the Nuremberg Trials about Canaris' courage in opposing Hitler. Lahousen recalled a conversation between Canaris and General Wilhelm Keitel in which Canaris warned Keitel that the German military would be held responsible for the atrocities in Poland. Keitel responded that they had been ordered by Hitler. Keitel, who also survived the war, was found guilty of war crimes at Nuremberg and hanged. |
Wilhelm Canaris
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GERMAN LEADERSHIP
- 01 - Adolf Hitler
- 02 - Heinrich Himmler
- 03 - Martin Bormann
- 04 - Hermann Goering
- 05 - Joseph Goebbles
- 06 - Rudolf Hess
- 07 - Reinhard Heydrich
- 08 - Joachim Von Ribbentrop
- 09 - Erwin Rommel
- 10 - Albert Speer
- 11 - Wilhelm Keitel
- 12 - Erich Von Manstein
- 13 - Karl Dönitz
- 14 - Manfred Von Killinger
- 15 - Adolf Eichmann
- 16 - Alfred Jodl
- 17 - Albert Kesselring
- 18 - Walter Von Reichenau
- 19 - Werner Blomberg
- 20 - Franz Von Papen
- 21 - Wilhelm Canaris
- 22 - Konstantin Von Neurath
- 23 - Arthur Seyss-Inquart
- 24 - Franz Epp
- 25 - Hans Günther Von Kluge
- 26 - Joseph Dietrich
- 27 - Friedrich Paulus
- 28 - Ludwig Beck
HOLOCAUST TIMELINE
WORLD WAR II TIMELINE 1939
WORLD WAR II TIMELINE 1940
- 01 - World war II timeline - January 1940
- 02 - World war II timeline - February 1940
- 03 - World war II timeline - March 1940
- 04 - World war II timeline - April 1940
- 05 - World war II timeline - May 1940
- 06 - World war II timeline - June 1940
- 07 - World war II timeline - July 1940
- 08 - World war II timeline - August 1940
- 09 - World war II timeline - September 1940
- 10 - World war II timeline - October 1940
- 11 - World war II timeline - November 1940
- 12 - World war II timeline - December 1940
WORLD WAR II TIMELINE 1941
- 01 - World war II timeline - January 1941
- 02 - World war II timeline - February 1941
- 03 - World war II timeline - March 1941
- 04 - World war II timeline - April 1941
- 05 - World war II timeline - May 1941
- 06 - World war II timeline - June 1941
- 07 - World war II timeline - July 1941
- 08 - World war II timeline - August 1941
- 09 - World war II timeline - September 1941
- 10 - World war II timeline - October 1941
- 11 - World war II timeline - November 1941
- 12 - World war II timeline - December 1941
WORLD WAR II BATTLE
- Battle of Britain - 10 July – 31 October 1940
- Battle of El Alamein - 1 – 27 July 1942
- Battle of El Alamein - 23 October – 5 November 1942
- Battle of Kursk - 4 July - 23 August 1943
- Battle of Midway - 2 - 7 June 1942
- Battle of Monte Cassino - 17 January – 18 May 1944
- Battle of Okinawa - 1 April 1945 - 22 June 1945
- Battle of Sevastopol - 30 October 1941 - 4 July 1942
- Battle of Stalingrad - 17 July 1942 - 2 February 1943
WORLD WAR II OPERATION
ADOLF HITLER DIRECTIVES
- Directive No. 01 - For the conduct of the war 31 August 1939
- Directive No. 16 - On preparations for a landing operation against England 16 July 1940
- Directive No. 17 - For the conduct of air and naval warfare against England 1 August 1940
- Directive No. 18 - Undertaking Felix 12 November 1940
- Directive No. 19 - Undertaking Attila 10 December 1940
- Directive No. 20 - Undertaking Marita 13 December 1940
- Directive No. 21 - Operation Barbarossa 18 Decemmber 1940
- Directive No. 28 - Undertaking Mercury 25 April 1941
- Directive No. 29 - Proposed Military Government of Greece 17 May 1941
- Directive No. 30 - Middle east 23 May 1941
- Directive No. 32 - Operation Orient 14 July 1941
- Directive No. 33 - Continuation of the war in the east 19 July 1941
- Directive No. 40 - Competence of Commanders in Coastal Areas 23 March 1942
- Directive No. 42 - Instructions for operations against unoccupied France and the Iberian Peninsula 29 May 1942
- Directive No. 45 - Continuation of Operation Brunswick 23 July 1942
- Directive No. 51 - Preparations for a two-front war 3 November 1943
STATISTICS WORLD WAR II
ADOLF HITLER MEIN KAMPF VOLUME I
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 01 - In the home of my parents
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 02 - Years of study and suffering in Vienna
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 03 - Political reflections arising out of my sojorun in Vienna
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 04 - Munich
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 05 - The world war
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 06 - War propaganda
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 07 - The revolution
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 08 - The beginnings of my political activites
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 09 - The German worker's party
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 10 - Why the second Reich collapsed
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 11 - Race and people
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 12 - The first stage in the development of the German national
ADOLF HITLER MEIN KAMPF VOLUME II
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 01 - Philosophy and party
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 02 - The state
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 03 - Citizens and subjects of the state
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 04 - Personality and the ideal of the people's state
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 05 - Philosophy and organization
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 06 - The struggle of the early period
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 07 - The conflict with the red forces
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 08 - The strong is strongest when alone
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 09 - Fundamental ideas regarding the nature and organization of the strom troops
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 10 - The mask of federalism
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 11 - Propaganda and organization
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 12 - The problem of the trade unions
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 13 - The German post war policy of alliances
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 14 - Germany's policy in eastern Europe
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 15 - The right to self defence
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