Battle of Midway - 2 - 7 June 1942

The Battle of Midway is widely regarded as the most important naval battle of the Pacific Campaign of World War II.Between 4 and 7 June 1942, approximately one month after the Battle of the Coral Sea and six months after Japan's attack on Pearl Harbor, the United States Navy decisively defeated an Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) attack against Midway Atoll, inflicting irreparable damage on the Japanese. The Japanese operation, like the earlier attack on Pearl Harbor, aimed to eliminate the United States as a strategic power in the Pacific, thereby giving Japan a free hand in establishing its Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. It was hoped another demoralizing defeat would force the U.S. to negotiate an end to the Pacific War on conditions favorable to Japan. The Japanese plan was to lure the United States' few remaining aircraft carriers into a trap.The Japanese also intended to occupy Midway Atoll as part of an overall plan to extend their defensive perimeter in response to the Doolittle Raid. This operation was considered preparatory for further attacks against Fiji and Samoa. The plan was handicapped by faulty Japanese assumptions of American reaction and poor initial dispositions.Most significantly, American codebreakers were able to determine the date and location of the attack, enabling the forewarned U.S. Navy to set up an ambush of its own. Four Japanese aircraft carriers and a heavy cruiser were sunk in exchange for one American aircraft carrier and a destroyer. The heavy losses in carriers and aircrews permanently weakened the Imperial Japanese Navy. Japan's shipbuilding and pilot training programs were unable to keep pace in replacing their losses, while the U.S. steadily increased output in both areas. Japan had been highly successful in swiftly securing its initial war goals, including the conquest of the Philippines, Malaya, Singapore, and the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia) with its vital resources. As such, preliminary planning for a second phase of operations commenced as early as January 1942. However, because of strategic differences between the Imperial Army and Imperial Navy, as well as infighting between the Navy's GHQ and Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto's Combined Fleet, the formulation of effective strategy was hampered, and the follow-up strategy was not finalized until April 1942.Admiral Yamamoto succeeded in winning a bureaucratic struggle, placing his operational concept—further operations in the Central Pacific—ahead of other contending plans. These included operations either directly or indirectly aimed at Australia and into the Indian Ocean. In the end, Yamamoto's thinly-veiled threat to resign unless he got his way carried his agenda forward. Yamamoto's primary strategic concern was the elimination of America's remaining carrier forces, which he perceived as the principal obstacle to the overall Pacific campaign.This concern was acutely heightened by the Doolittle Raid on Tokyo (18 April 1942) by USAAF B-25s launched from USS Hornet. The raid, while militarily insignificant, was a severe psychological shock to the Japanese and showed the existence of a gap in the defenses around the Japanese home islands.Sinking America's aircraft carriers and seizing Midway, the only strategic islands besides Hawaii in the eastern Pacific, was seen as the only means of nullifying this threat. Yamamoto reasoned an operation against the main carrier base at Pearl Harbor would induce the U.S. to fight. However, given the strength of American land-based air power on Hawaii, he judged the powerful American base could not be attacked directly.Instead, he selected Midway, at the extreme northwest end of the Hawaiian Island chain, some 1,300 miles (2,100 km) from Oahu. Midway was not especially important in the larger scheme of Japan's intentions, but the Japanese felt the Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl Harbor and would therefore strongly defend it.The U.S. did consider Midway vital; after the battle, establishment of a U.S. submarine base on Midway allowed submarines operating from Pearl Harbor to refuel and reprovision, extending their radius of operations by 1,200 mi (1,900 km). An airstrip on Midway served as a forward staging point for bomber attacks on Wake Island. Yamamoto's plan Typical of Japanese naval planning during World War II, Yamamoto's battle plan was exceedingly complex.Additionally, his design was predicated on optimistic intelligence suggesting USS Enterprise and USS Hornet, forming Task Force 16, were the only carriers available to the U.S. Pacific Fleet at the time. USS Lexington had been sunk and USS Yorktown severely damaged (and believed by the Japanese to have been sunk) at the Battle of the Coral Sea just a month earlier. The Japanese were also aware that USS Saratoga was undergoing repairs on the West Coast after suffering torpedo damage from a submarine. However, more important was Yamamoto's belief the Americans had been demoralized by their frequent defeats during the preceding six months. Yamamoto felt deception would be required to lure the U.S. fleet into a fatally compromised situation.To this end, he dispersed his forces so that their full extent (particularly his battleships) would be unlikely to be discovered by the Americans prior to battle. Critically, Yamamoto's supporting battleships and cruisers would trail Vice-Admiral Nagumo Chūichi's carrier striking force by several hundred miles. Japan's heavy surface forces were intended to destroy whatever part of the U.S. fleet might come to Midway's relief, once Nagumo's carriers had weakened them sufficiently for a daylight gun duel;this was typical of the battle doctrine of most major navies. Unbeknownst to Yamamoto, the United States had broken the main Japanese naval code (dubbed JN-25 by the Americans). Yamamoto's emphasis on dispersal also meant that none of his formations could support each other. For instance, the only significant warships larger than destroyers that screened Nagumo's fleet were two battleships and three cruisers, despite his carriers being expected to carry out the strikes and bear the brunt of American counterattacks. By contrast, the flotillas of Yamamoto and Kondo had between them two light carriers, five battleships, and six cruisers, none of which would see any action at Midway.Their distance from Nagumo's carriers would also have grave implications during the battle, since the larger warships in Yamamoto and Kondo's forces carried scout planes, an invaluable reconnaissance capability denied to Nagumo. Likewise, the Japanese operations in the Aleutian Islands (Operation AL) removed yet more ships that could otherwise have augmented the force striking Midway. Whereas prior historical accounts have often characterized the Aleutians operation as a feint to draw American forces away, recent scholarship on the battle has suggested that AL was supposed to be launched simultaneously with the attack on Midway.However, a one-day delay in the sailing of Nagumo's task force meant that Operation AL began a day before the Midway attack. American reinforcements To do battle with an enemy force anticipated to muster four or five carriers, Admiral Chester W. Nimitz (Commander in Chief, Pacific Ocean Areas) needed every available U.S. flight deck. He already had Vice Admiral William Halsey's two-carrier (Enterprise and Hornet) task force at hand, though Halsey was stricken with psoriasis and had to be replaced by Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance (Halsey's escort commander).Nimitz also hurriedly called back Rear Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher's task force, including the carrier Yorktown (which had suffered considerable damage at the Battle of the Coral Sea), from the South West Pacific Area. He reached Pearl Harbor just in time to provision and sail. Despite estimates that Yorktown would require several months of repairs at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard, her elevators were intact, and her flight deck largely so.The Pearl Harbor Naval Shipyard worked around the clock and in 72 hours, she was restored to a battle-ready state,judged good enough for two or three weeks of operations, as Nimitz required.Her flight deck was patched, whole sections of internal frames cut out and replaced, and several new squadrons were drawn from Saratoga; they did not, however, get time to train.Nimitz disregarded established procedure in getting his third and last available carrier ready for battle. Just three days after putting into dry dock at Pearl Harbor, Yorktown was again under way. Repairs continued even as she sortied, with work crews from the repair ship USS Vestal, herself damaged in the attack on Pearl Harbor six months earlier, still aboard. On Midway Island, the USAAF stationed four squadrons of B-17 Flying Fortresses, along with several B-26 Marauders. The Marine Corps had 19 SBD Dauntlesses, seven F4F-3 Wildcats, 17 Vought SBU-3 Vindicators, 21 Brewster F2A-3s, and six Grumman TBF-1 Avengers, the latter a detachment of VT-8 from Hornet. Japanese shortcomings Meanwhile, as a result of her participation in the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Japanese carrier Zuikaku was in port in Kure, awaiting a replacement air group. That there were none immediately available was a failure of the IJN crew training program, which already showed signs of being unable to replace losses.Instructors from the Yokosuka Air Corps were employed in an effort to make up the shortfall.The heavily-damaged Shōkaku had suffered three bomb hits at Coral Sea, and required months of repair in drydock. Despite the likely availability of sufficient aircraft between the two ships to re-equip Zuikaku with a composite air group, the Japanese made no serious attempt to get her into the forthcoming battle.Consequently, Admiral Nagumo would only have four fleet carriers: Kaga and Akagi forming Carrier Division 1; Hiryū and Sōryū as Carrier Division 2. At least part of this was a product of fatigue; Japanese carriers had been constantly on operations since 7 December 1941, including raids on Darwin and Colombo. The main Japanese strike aircraft to be used were the Aichi D3A1 dive bomber and the Nakajima B5N2, which was capable of being used either as a torpedo bomber or as a level attack bomber. The main carrier fighter was the fast and highly maneuverable Mitsubishi A6M2 Zero.However, the carriers of the Kido Butai were suffering from a shortage of frontline aircraft. For various reasons, production of the D3A had been drastically reduced, while that of the B5N had been stopped completely. As a consequence, there were none available to replace losses. This also meant that many of the aircraft being used during the June 1942 operations had been operational since late November 1941; although well maintained, they were almost worn out and had become increasingly unreliable. These factors meant that all carriers had fewer than their normal aircraft complement and few spare aircraft. Japanese strategic scouting arrangements prior to the battle were also in disarray. A picket line of Japanese submarines was late getting into position (partly because of Yamamoto's haste), which let the American carriers reach their assembly point northeast of Midway (known as "Point Luck") without being detected.A second attempt at reconnaissance, using four-engine Kawanishi H8K flying boats to scout Pearl Harbor prior to the battle (and thereby detect the absence or presence of the American carriers), part of Operation K, was also thwarted when Japanese submarines assigned to refuel the search aircraft discovered that the intended refueling point—a hitherto deserted bay off French Frigate Shoals—was occupied by American warships (because the Japanese had carried out an identical mission in March).Thus, Japan was deprived of any knowledge concerning the movements of the American carriers immediately before the battle. Japanese radio intercepts did notice an increase in both American submarine activity and message traffic. This information was in Yamamoto's hands prior to the battle. However, Japanese plans were not changed; Yamamoto, at sea on Yamato, did not dare inform Nagumo for fear of exposing his position and assumed that Nagumo had received the same signal from Tokyo.Nagumo's radio antennae, however, were unable to receive such long-wave transmissions, and he was left unaware of any American ship movements. Allied code-breaking Admiral Nimitz had one priceless asset: cryptanalysts had broken the JN-25 code.Commander Joseph J. Rochefort and his team at HYPO were able to confirm Midway as the target of the impending Japanese strike, to determine the date of the attack as either 4 or 5 June, and to provide Nimitz with a complete IJN order of battle.Japan's efforts to introduce a new codebook had been delayed, giving HYPO several crucial days; while it was blacked out shortly before the attack began, the important breaks had already been made As a result, the Americans entered the battle with a very good picture of where, when, and in what strength the Japanese would appear. Nimitz was aware, for example, that the vast Japanese numerical superiority had been divided into no less than four task forces. This dispersal resulted in few fast ships being available to escort the Carrier Striking Force, limiting the anti-aircraft guns protecting the carriers. Nimitz thus calculated that his three carrier decks, plus Midway Island, to Yamamoto's four, gave the U.S. rough parity, especially since American carrier air groups were larger than Japanese ones. The Japanese, by contrast, remained almost totally unaware of their opponent's true strength and dispositions even after the battle began. Initial air attacks The first air attack took off at 12:30 on 3 June, consisting of nine B-17s operating from Midway. Three hours later, they found the Japanese transport group 570 nmi (656 mi; 1,056 km) to the west.Under heavy anti-aircraft fire, they dropped their bombs. Though hits were reported,none of the bombs actually landed on target and no significant damage was inflicted.[45] Early the following morning, Japanese oil tanker Akebono Maru sustained the first hit when a torpedo from an attacking PBY flying boat struck her around 01:00. At 04:30 on 4 June, Nagumo launched his initial attack on Midway itself, consisting of 36 Aichi D3A dive-bombers and 36 Nakajima B5N torpedo bombers, escorted by 36 Zero fighters. At the same time, he launched combat air patrol (CAP), as well as his eight search aircraft (one from the heavy cruiser Tone launched 30 minutes late due to technical difficulties). Japanese reconnaissance arrangements were flimsy, with too few aircraft to adequately cover the assigned search areas, laboring under poor weather conditions to the northeast and east of the task force.Yamamoto's faulty dispositions had now become a serious liability. American radar picked up the enemy at a distance of several miles and interceptors were soon scrambled. Unescorted bombers headed off to attack the Japanese carrier fleet, their fighter escorts remaining behind to defend Midway. At 06:20, Japanese carrier aircraft bombed and heavily damaged the U.S. base. Midway-based Marine fighter pilots, flying obsolescent F4F-3s and obsolete F2A-3s, intercepted the Japanese and suffered heavy losses, though they managed to destroy four bombers and at least three Zeros. Most of the U.S. planes were downed in the first few minutes; several were damaged, and only two remained flyable. In all, three F4Fs and 13 F2As were shot down. American anti-aircraft fire was accurate and intense, damaging many Japanese aircraft and claiming a third of the Japanese planes destroyed. The initial Japanese attack did not succeed in neutralizing Midway. American bombers could still use the airbase to refuel and attack the Japanese invasion force; another aerial attack would be necessary if troops were to go ashore by 7 June. Having taken off prior to the Japanese attack, American bombers based on Midway made several attacks on the Japanese carrier fleet. These included six TBFs from Hornet's VT-8, their crews on their first combat operation, and four USAAF B-26 Marauders armed with torpedoes. The Japanese shrugged off these attacks with almost no losses (as few as two fighters lost), while destroying all but one TBF and two B-26s. One B-26, hit by anti-aircraft fire from Akagi, made no attempt to pull out of its run and narrowly missed crashing directly into the carrier's bridge. This experience may well have contributed to Nagumo's determination to launch another attack on Midway, in direct violation of Yamamoto's order to keep the reserve strike force armed for anti-ship operations. Nagumo's decision Admiral Nagumo, in accordance with Japanese carrier doctrine at the time, had kept half of his aircraft in reserve. These comprised two squadrons each of dive bombers and torpedo bombers, the latter armed with torpedoes, should any American warships be located. The dive bombers were, as yet, unarmed.As a result of the attacks from Midway, as well as the morning flight leader's recommendation of a second strike, at 07:15, Nagumo ordered his reserve planes to be re-armed with contact-fused general purpose bombs for use against land targets. Some sources maintain that this had been underway for about 30 minutes when, at 07:40the delayed scout plane from Tone signaled the discovery of a sizable American naval force to the east; however, new evidence suggests Nagumo did not receive the sighting report until 08:00, so the rearming operation actually proceeded for 45 minutes.Nagumo quickly reversed his order and demanded the scout plane ascertain the composition of the American force. Another 40 minutes elapsed before Tone's scout finally radioed the presence of a single carrier in the American force, TF 16 (the other carrier being missed). Nagumo was now in a quandary. Rear Admiral Yamaguchi Tamon, leading Carrier Division 2 (Hiryū and Sōryū), recommended Nagumo strike immediately with the forces at hand: 18 Aichi D3A2 dive bombers each on Sōryū and Hiryū, and half the ready cover patrol aircraft.Nagumo's seeming opportunity to hit the American ships,however, was now limited by the fact his Midway strike force would be returning shortly and needing to land promptly or ditch (as is commonly believed).Because of the constant flight deck activity associated with combat air patrol operations during the preceding hour, the Japanese never had an opportunity to spot their reserve for launch. The few aircraft on the Japanese flight decks at the time of the attack were either defensive fighters, or (in the case of Sōryū) fighters being spotted to augment the task force defenses.Spotting his flight decks and launching aircraft would have required at least 30–45 minutes.Furthermore, by spotting and launching immediately, Nagumo would be committing some of his reserve to battle without proper anti-ship armament; he had just witnessed how easily unescorted American bombers had been shot down.(In the event, poor discipline saw many of the Japanese bombers ditch their bombs and attempt to dogfight interceptor F4Fs.)Japanese carrier doctrine preferred fully constituted strikes, and without confirmation (until 08:20) of whether the American force included carriers, Nagumo's reaction was doctrinaire.In addition, the arrival of another American air strike at 07:53 gave weight to the need to attack the island again. In the end, Nagumo chose to wait for his first strike force to land, then launch the reserve, which would by then be properly armed and ready. In the final analysis, it made no difference; Fletcher's carriers had launched beginning at 07:00, so the aircraft which would deliver the crushing blow were already on their way. There was nothing Nagumo could do about it. This was the fatal flaw of Yamamoto's dispositions: it followed strictly traditional battleship doctrine. Attacks on the Japanese fleet Meanwhile, the Americans had already launched their carrier aircraft against the Japanese. Admiral Fletcher, in overall command aboard Yorktown, and benefiting from PBY patrol bomber sighting reports from the early morning, ordered Spruance to launch against the Japanese as soon as was practical, while initially holding Yorktown in reserve should there be any other Japanese carriers discovered.Fletcher's directions to Spruance was relayed via Nimitz who, unlike Yamamoto, had remained ashore. Spruance gave the order "Launch the attack" at around 06:00 and left Halsey's Chief of Staff, Captain Miles Browning, to work out the details and oversee the launch. It took until a few minutes after 07:00 before the first plane was able to depart from Spruance's carriers, Enterprise and Hornet. Fletcher, upon completing his own scouting flights, followed suit at 08:00 from Yorktown. Ironically, Fletcher, Yorktown commander officer Captain Elliott Buckmaster, and their staffs had acquired first-hand experience in organizing and launching a full strike against an enemy force from Coral Sea, but there was no time to pass these lessons to Enterprise and Hornet which were tasked with launching the first strike.Spruance gave his second crucial command, to run toward the target quickly, as neutralizing an enemy carrier was the key to their own carriers' survival. He judged that the need to throw something at the enemy as soon as possible was greater than the need for a coordinated attack among the different types of aircraft (fighters, bombers, torpedo planes). Accordingly, American squadrons were launched piecemeal and proceeded to the target in several different groups. The lack of coordination was expected to diminish the overall impact of the American attacks as well as increasing their casualties. However, Spruance calculated that this risk was worth it, since keeping the Japanese under aerial attack hampered their ability to launch a counterstrike (Japanese doctrine preferred fully constituted attacks), and he gambled that he could find Nagumo with his decks at their most vulnerable. American carrier aircraft had difficulty locating the target, despite the positions they had been given. The strike from Hornet, led by CDR Stanhope C. Ring, followed an incorrect heading of 263 degrees rather than the 240 heading indicated by the contact report. As a result, Air Group Eight's dive bombers missed the Japanese carriers.Torpedo Squadron 8 (VT-8, from Hornet), led by LCDR John C. Waldron broke formation from Ring and followed the correct heading. Waldron's squadron sighted the enemy carriers and began attacking at 09:20, followed by Torpedo Squadron 6 (VT-6, from Enterprise) at 09:40.Without fighter escort, every TBD Devastator of VT-8 was shot down without being able to inflict any damage, with Ensign George H. Gay, Jr. the only survivor. VT-6 met nearly the same fate, with no hits to show for its effort, thanks in part to the abysmal performance of their Mark 13 aircraft torpedoes;senior Navy and BuOrd officers never questioned why half a dozen torpeodes, released so close to the Japanese carriers, produced no results.The Japanese combat air patrol, flying the much faster Mitsubishi A6M2 "Zeros", made short work of the unescorted, slow, under-armed TBDs. A few TBDs managed get within a few ship-lengths range of their targets before dropping their torpedoes, being close enough to be able to strafe the enemy ships and force the Japanese carriers to make sharp evasive maneuvers. Despite their losses, the American torpedo attacks indirectly achieved three important results. First, they kept the Japanese carriers off balance, with no ability to prepare and launch their own counterstrike. Second, their attacks pulled the Japanese combat air patrol out of position. Third, many of the Zeros ran low on ammunition and fuel.The appearance of a third torpedo plane attack from the southeast by Torpedo Squadron 3 (VT-3) at 10:00 very quickly drew the majority of the Japanese CAP to the southeast quadrant of the fleet.Better discipline, and employment of all the Zeroes aboard, might have enabled Nagumo to succeed. By chance, at the same time VT-3 was sighted by the Japanese, two squadrons of American SBD Dauntless dive bombers from Enterprise and Yorktown, VB-6 and VB-3 respectively, were approaching the Japanese fleet from the northeast and southwest. They were running low on fuel because of the time spent looking for the enemy. However, squadron commander C. Wade McClusky, Jr. decided to continue the search and luckily spotted the wake of the Japanese destroyer Arashi. The destroyer was steaming at full speed to rejoin Nagumo's carrier force after having unsuccessfully depth-charged the U.S. submarine Nautilus, which had earlier unsuccessfully attacked the battleship Kirishima.Some bombers were lost from fuel exhaustion before the attack commenced. McClusky's decision to continue the search was credited by Admiral Chester Nimitz, and his judgment "decided the fate of our carrier task force and our forces at Midway..."The American dive-bombers arrived at the perfect time to attack.Armed Japanese strike aircraft filled the hangar decks, fuel hoses snaked across the decks as refueling operations were hastily completed, and the repeated change of ordnance meant bombs and torpedoes were stacked around the hangars, rather than stowed safely in the magazines,making the Japanese carriers extraordinarily vulnerable. Enterprise's VB-6 air group split up and attacked two targets. Beginning at 10:22, McCluskey and his wingmen scored multiple hits on Kaga, while to the north Akagi was struck four minutes later by three bombers.Yorktown's VB-3 commanded by Max Leslie went for Sōryū. Simultaneously, VT-3 targeted Hiryū, which was sandwiched between Sōryū, Kaga, and Akagi, but scored no hits. By contrast, the dive-bombers, within six minutes, left Sōryū, Kaga, and Akagi heavily ablaze. Akagi was hit by just one bomb, which penetrated to the upper hangar deck and exploded among the armed and fueled aircraft there. One bomb exploded underwater very close astern, the resulting geyser bending the flight deck upward and also causing crucial rudder damage.Sōryū took three bombs in her hangar deck; Kaga, at least four, possibly more. All three carriers were out of action and were eventually abandoned and scuttled. Japanese counterattacks Hiryū, the sole surviving Japanese aircraft carrier, wasted little time in counterattacking. The first wave of Japanese dive bombers badly damaged Yorktown with three bomb hits that snuffed out her boilers, immobilizing her, yet her damage control teams patched her up so effectively (in about an hour) that the second wave's torpedo bombers mistook her for an undamaged carrier.Despite Japanese hopes to even the odds by eliminating two carriers with two strikes, Yorktown absorbed both Japanese attacks, the second wave mistakenly believing Yorktown had already been sunk and they were attacking Enterprise. After two torpedo hits, Yorktown lost power and developed a 26° list to port, which put her out of action and forced Admiral Fletcher to move his command staff to the heavy cruiser Astoria. Both carriers of Spruance's Task Force 16 were undamaged. News of the two strikes, with the reports that each had sunk an American carrier, greatly improved morale in the Kido Butai. Its few surviving aircraft were all recovered aboard Hiryū, where they were prepared for a strike against what was believed to be the only remaining American carrier. Late in the afternoon, a Yorktown scout aircraft located Hiryū, prompting Enterprise to launch a final strike of dive bombers (including 10 bombers from Yorktown). This delivered a killing blow, leaving Hiryū ablaze, despite being defended by a strong defensive cover of more than a dozen Zero fighters. Vice Admiral Yamaguchi chose to go down with his ship, costing Japan perhaps her best carrier sailor. Hornet's strike, launching late because of a communications error, concentrated on the remaining escort ships, but failed to score any hits. As darkness fell, both sides took stock and made tentative plans for continuing the action. Admiral Fletcher, obliged to abandon derelict Yorktown and feeling he could not adequately command from a cruiser, ceded operational command to Spruance. Spruance knew the United States had won a great victory, but was still unsure of what Japanese forces remained and was determined to safeguard both Midway and his carriers. To aid his aviators, who had launched at extreme range, he had continued to close with Nagumo during the day, and persisted as night fell. Fearing a possible night encounter with Japanese surface forces.Spruance changed course and withdrew to the east, turning back west towards the enemy at midnight. For his part, Yamamoto initially decided to continue the engagement and sent his remaining surface forces searching eastward for the American carriers. Simultaneously, a cruiser raiding force was detached to bombard the island. The Japanese surface forces failed to make contact with the Americans due to Spruance's decision to briefly withdraw eastward, and Yamamoto ordered a general retirement to the west. American search planes failed to detect the retiring Japanese task forces on 5 June. An afternoon strike narrowly missed detecting Yamamoto's main body and failed to score hits on a straggling Japanese destroyer. The strike planes returned to the carriers after nightfall, prompting Spruance to order Enterprise and Hornet to turn on searchlights in order to aid their landings. At 02:15 on 5/6 June, Commander John Murphy's Tambor, lying some 90 nmi (100 mi; 170 km) west of Midway, made the second of the Submarine Force's two major contributions to the battle's outcome. Sighting several ships, he (along with his exec, Ray Spruance, Jr.) could not identify them (and feared they might be friendly, so he held fire), but reported their presence, omitting their course. This went to Admiral Robert English, Commander, Submarine Force, Pacific Fleet (COMSUBPAC), and from him through Nimitz to the senior Spruance. Unaware of the exact location of Yamamoto's "Main Body" (a persistent problem since PBYs had first sighted the Japanese), Spruance presumed this was the invasion force. Thus, he moved to block it, taking station some 100 nmi (120 mi; 190 km) northeast of Midway; this frustrated Yamamoto's efforts, and the night passed without any contact between the opposing forces. Actually, this was Yamamoto's bombardment group of four cruisers and two destroyers, which at 02:55 was ordered to retire west with the rest of his force.Tambor was sighted around the same time; turning to avoid, Mogami and Mikuma collided, inflicting serious damage to Mogami's bow, the most any of the 18 submarines deployed for the battle achieved. Only at 04:12 did the sky brighten enough for Murphy to be certain the ships were Japanese, by which time staying surfaced was a hazard, and he dived to approach for an attack. This was unsuccessful, and at around 06:00, he finally reported two Mogami-class cruisers, westbound, placing Spruance at least 100 nmi (120 mi; 190 km) out of position.It may have been fortunate Spruance did not pursue, for had he come in contact with Yamamoto's heavy ships, including Yamato, in the dark, his cruisers would have been overwhelmed, and his carriers helpless.(At that time, only Britain's Fleet Air Arm was capable of night carrier operations.) Over the following two days, first Midway and then Spruance's carriers launched several successive strikes against the stragglers. Mikuma was eventually sunk by Dauntlesses[96], while Mogami survived severe damage to return home for repairs. Captain Richard E. Fleming, a U.S. Marine Corps aviator, was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his attack on Mikuma. Meanwhile, salvage efforts on Yorktown were encouraging and she was taken in tow by USS Vireo, until late afternoon on 6 June when Yorktown was struck by two torpedoes from I-168. There were few casualties aboard Yorktown, since most of the crew had already been evacuated, but a third torpedo from this salvo also struck and sank the destroyer USS Hammann, which had been providing auxiliary power to Yorktown. Hammann broke in two with the loss of 80 lives. Most of the lives lost were due to her own depth charges exploding. Yorktown lingered until just after 06:00 on 7 June.

25 May 1942	A large Imperial Japanese Naval force sails for Japan towards Midway Island. The force Is made up of four task forces. One is charged with the invasion of the Aleutian Islands off of Alaska while the other three are to take Midway Island itself and assail the responding USN fleet. One group contains the required four aircraft carriers.
28 May 1942	The final Imperial Japanese Task Force leaves mainland Japan.
3 June 1942	The Northern Task Force begins its operation to take the Aleutian Island chain and divert USN forces to the region.
4 - 5 June 1942	At 4:30AM, the bombing of Midway Island begins with aircraft from Vice-Admiral Nagumo's First Carrier Strike Force. American fighter aircraft take heavy losses but force the Japanese Navy to launch a second attack. At 7:28AM, a Japanese reconniassance plane spots spots ten undetermined USN surface ships 200 miles northeast of the Japanese Midway invasion force. At 7:52AM, USS Enterprise and USS Hornet launch their dive bombers and torpedo planes. At 8:20AM, a surprised Nagumo receives his first report of American carriers in the area. At 8:37AM, aircraft of the second Japanese strike force returns to their respective carriers for rearming and refueling. At 9:00AM, USS Yorktown launches her aircraft with Nagumo's carrier force as the prime target. At 9:18AM, Nagumo reacts to the American presence and changes the course of his Carrier Strike Force. Between 9:30AM and 10:00AM, Torpedo planes from the USS Enterprise and USS Hornet begin their attacks on the Japanese carriers. The first wave of USN carrier dive-bombers has difficulty in locating their Japanese targets. All incoming USN Devastator attackers are shot down by Japanese Zero fighters in the span of six minutes. The initial American assault on the Japanese carrier strike force is over by 10:00AM. At 10:25AM, a follow-up strike made up of 37 Dauntless dive bombers finds the Japanese carriers - now stocked with armed and fueled aircraft on their decks. The three Japanese carriers - Kaga, Soryu and Akagi - are struck with bombs and ultimately sunk. At 12:00PM, Imperial Japanese Navy bomber aircraft strike against the attacking USS Yorktown. By 2:30PM, the USS Yorktown is severely damaged bu does not sink. By 3:00PM, the crew of the USS Yorktown has abandoned their carrier. The damaged vessel is towed by USN ships. At 5:00PM, the Imperial Japanese aircraft carrier Hiryu is set ablaze after being struck by no fewer than five direct bomb hits from aircraft of the USS Enterprise.
5 June 1942	The Japanese carrier Hiryu is scuttled.
6 June 1942	The USS Yorktown, now severely damaged an in tow of US Navy forces, is targeted and sunk by a Japanese submarine. The island of Kiska is taken by Japanese forces.
7 June 1942	The island of Attu is taken by Japanese forces.
15 August 1942	The Aleutian Islands Campaign comes to a close. The Japanese invasion is ultimately repelled.