Karl Dönitz was born in Grünau in Berlin, Germany to Anna Beyer and Emil Dönitz, an engineer. Karl had an older brother, Friedrich. In 1910, Dönitz enlisted in the Imperial German Navy (Kaiserliche Marine). He became a sea-cadet (Seekadett) on 4 April. On 15 April 1911, he became a midshipman (Fähnrich zur See), the rank given to those who had served for one year as officer's apprentice and had passed their first examination. On 27 September 1913, Dönitz was commissioned as an Acting Navy Second Lieutenant (Leutnant zur See). When World War I began, he served on the light cruiser SMS Breslau in the Mediterranean Sea. In August 1914, Breslau and the battlecruiser SMS Goeben were sold to the Ottoman navy; the ships were retitled the Midilli and the Yavuz Sultan Selim, respectively. They began operating out of Constantinople (now Istanbul), under Rear Admiral Wilhelm Souchon, engaging Russian forces in the Black Sea. On 22 March 1916, Dönitz was promoted to Navy First Lieutenant (Oberleutnant zur See). When Midilli put into dock for repairs, he was temporarily assigned as airfield commander at the Dardanelles. From there, he requested a transfer to the submarine forces, which became effective in October 1916. He served as watch officer on U-39, and from February 1918 onward as commander of UC-25. On 5 September 1918, he became commander of UB-68, operating in the Mediterranean. On 4 October, this boat was sunk by British forces and Dönitz was taken prisoner on the island of Malta. In September 1939, Germany invaded Poland, Britain and France declared war on Germany, and World War II began. The Kriegsmarine was caught unprepared for war, having anticipated that the war's outbreak would be in 1945, not 1939. The Z Plan was tailored for this assumption, calling for a balanced fleet with a greatly increased number of surface capital ships, including several aircraft carriers. At the time the war began, Dönitz's force included only 57 U-boats, many of them short-range, and only 22 oceangoing Type VIIs. He made do with what he had, while being harassed by Raeder and with Hitler calling on him to dedicate boats to military actions against the British fleet directly. These operations had mixed success; the aircraft carrier Courageous and battleship Royal Oak were sunk, and battleships Nelson and Barham damaged, at a cost of some U-boats, diminishing the small quantity available even further. Together with surface raiders, merchant shipping lines were also attacked by U-boats. On 1 October 1939, Dönitz became a Rear Admiral (Konteradmiral) and "Commander of the Submarines" (Befehlshaber der Unterseeboote, BdU, the German equivalent of ComSubPac or ComSubLant); on 1 September the following year, he was made a Vice Admiral (Vizeadmiral).By 1941, the delivery of new Type VIIs had improved to the point where operations were having a real effect on the British wartime economy. Although production of merchant ships shot up in response, improved torpedoes, better U-boats, and much better operational planning led to increasing numbers of "kills". On 11 December 1941, following Adolf Hitler's declaration of war on the United States, Dönitz immediately planned for implementation of Operation Drumbeat (Unternehmen Paukenschlag). This targeted shipping along the East Coast of the United States. Carried out the next month, with only nine U-boats (all the larger Type IX), it had dramatic and far-reaching results. The U.S. Navy was entirely unprepared for antisubmarine warfare, despite having had two years of British experience to draw from, and committed every imaginable mistake. Shipping losses, which had appeared to be coming under control as the Royal Navy and Royal Canadian Navy gradually adapted to the new challenge, skyrocketed. On at least two occasions, Allied success against U-boat operations led Dönitz to investigate possible reasons. Among those considered were espionage and Allied interception and decoding of German Navy communications (the naval version of the Enigma cipher machine). Both investigations into communications security came to the conclusion espionage was more likely, or else the Allied successes had been accidental. Nevertheless, Dönitz ordered his U-boat fleet to use an improved version of the Enigma machine (one with four or five rotors, which was even more secure), the M4, for communications within the fleet, on 1 February 1942. The German Navy (Kriegsmarine) was the only branch to use the improved version; the rest of the German armed forces (Wehrmacht) continued to use their then-current three-rotor versions of the Enigma machine. The new system was termed "Triton" ("Shark" to the Allies). For a time, this change in encryption between submarines caused considerable difficulty for Allied codebreakers; it took ten months before Shark traffic could be read (see also Ultra codebreaking and Cryptanalysis of the Enigma). By the end of 1942, the production of Type VII U-boats had increased to the point where Dönitz was finally able to conduct mass attacks by groups of submarines, a tactic he called "Rudel" (group or pack) and became known as "wolfpack" in English. Allied shipping losses shot up tremendously, and there was serious concern for a while about the state of British fuel supplies. During 1943, the war in the Atlantic turned against the Germans, but Dönitz continued to push for increased U-boat construction and entertained the notion that further technological developments would tip the war once more in Germany's favor while briefing the Führer.At the end of the war, the German submarine fleet was by far the most advanced in the world, and late-war examples, such as the Type XXI U-boat, served as models for Soviet and American construction after the war. These, the Schnorchel and Type XXI boats, appeared late in the war because of Dönitz's personal indifference, at times even hostility, to new technology he perceived as disruptive.His opposition to the larger Type IX was not unique; Admiral Thomas C. Hart, who commanded the United States Asiatic Fleet in the Philippines at the outbreak of the Pacific War, opposed fleet boats as "too luxurious". Dönitz was deeply involved in the daily operations of his boats, often contacting them up to seventy times a day with questions such as their position, fuel supply, and other "minutiae". This incessant questioning hastened the compromise of his ciphers, by giving the Allies more messages to work with. Furthermore, replies from the boats enabled the Allies to use direction finding (HF/DF, called "Huff-Duff") to locate a U-boat using its radio, track it, and attack it (often with aircraft able to sink it with impunity). Dönitz wore on his uniform both the special grade of the U-Boat War Badge with diamonds, and his U-Boat War badge from World War I, along with his WWI Iron Cross 1st Class with WWII clasp. On 30 January 1943, Dönitz replaced Erich Raeder as Commander-in-Chief of the Navy (Oberbefehlshaber der Kriegsmarine) and Grand Admiral (Großadmiral) of the Naval High Command (Oberkommando der Marine). His deputy, Eberhard Godt, took over the operational command of the U-boat force.[13] It was Dönitz who was able to convince Hitler not to scrap the remaining ships of the surface fleet. Despite hoping to continue to use them as a fleet in being, the Kriegsmarine continued losing what few capital ships it had. In September, the battleship Tirpitz was put out of action for months by a British midget submarine. In December, he ordered the battlecruiser Scharnhorst (under Konteradmiral Erich Bey) to attack Soviet-bound convoys, but she was sunk in the resulting encounter with superior British forces led by the battleship HMS Duke of York. On 30 April 1945, Hitler committed suicide. In his last testament, Hitler expelled both Hermann Göring and Heinrich Himmler from the Nazi Party. Hitler decided not to designate one man to succeed him as Führer but to revert to an older constitutional arrangement. He designated Dönitz his successor as Staatsoberhaupt (Head of State), with the title of Reichspräsident (President) and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces. Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels became Head of Government with the title of Reichskanzler (Chancellor). However, on 1 May, Goebbels committed suicide, the day after Hitler's death. Hitler believed the leaders of the German Army (Wehrmacht Heer), Air Force (Luftwaffe), and SS (Schutzstaffel) had betrayed him. So, because the German Navy had been too small to affect the war in a major way, the leader of the navy became the only possible successor by default.On 1 May, following Goebbels's suicide, Dönitz became the sole representative of the crumbling German Reich. He appointed Count Ludwig Schwerin von Krosigk as Reichskanzler and they attempted to form a government. That night, Dönitz made a nationwide radio address in which he spoke of Hitler's "hero's death" and announced that the war would continue "to save Germany from destruction by the advancing Bolshevik enemy." However, even then Dönitz knew that Germany's position was untenable. During his brief period in office, Dönitz devoted most of his efforts to ensuring the loyalty of the German armed forces and trying to ensure German troops would surrender to the British or Americans and not the Soviets. He feared vengeful Soviet reprisals against Nazi party members and high-ranking officers like himself, and hoped to strike a deal with the western Allies. Despite his postwar claims, Dönitz was seen as supportive of Nazism during the war.Several naval officers described him as "closely tied to Hitler and Nazi ideology."On one occasion, he went as far as to boast about Hitler's humanity.Another event, in which he spoke to Hitler Youth in what was defined as an "inappropriate way", earned him the nickname of "Hitler Boy Dönitz."He refused to assist Albert Speer in stopping a scorched earth policy dictated by Hitler[17] and is also noted as saying, "in comparison to Hitler we are all pip-squeaks. Anyone who believes he can do better than the Führer is stupid." There are several antisemitic statements on the part of Dönitz known to historians.When Sweden closed its international waters to Germany, he blamed this action on their fear and dependence on "international Jewish capital."In August 1944, he declared, "I would rather eat dirt than see my grandchildren grow up in the filthy, poisonous atmosphere of Jewry." On German Heroes' Day (12 March) 1944, Dönitz declared, without Adolf Hitler, Germany would be beset by "poison of Jewry," the country destroyed for lack of National Socialism which, as Dönitz declared, gave defiance of an uncompromising ideology.At the Nuremberg Trials, Dönitz claimed the statement about "poison of Jewry" was regarding "the endurance, the power to endure, of the people, as it was composed, could be better preserved than if there were Jewish elements in the nation." Initially he claimed, "I could imagine that it would be very difficult for the population in the towns to hold out under the strain of heavy bombing attacks if such an influence was allowed to work." Author Eric Zillmer argues that from an ideological standpoint, Dönitz was anti-Marxist and anti-Semitic.Later, during the Nuremberg Trials, Dönitz claimed to know nothing about the extermination of Jews and declared nobody among "his men" thought about violence against Jews. Dönitz told Leon Goldensohn, an American psychiatrist at Nuremberg, "I never had any idea of the goings-on as far as Jews were concerned. Hitler said each man should take care of his business, and mine was U-boats and the navy".To Goldensohn, Dönitz also spoke of his support for Admiral Bernhard Rogge, who was of Jewish descent, when the Nazi Party began to persecute the admiral. Dönitz was released on 1 October 1956, and he retired to the small village of Aumühle in Schleswig-Holstein in northern West Germany. There he worked on two books. His memoirs, Zehn Jahre, Zwanzig Tage (Memoirs: Ten Years and Twenty Days), appeared in Germany in 1958 and became available in an English translation the following year. This book recounted Dönitz's experiences as U-boat commander (ten years) and President of Germany (twenty days). In it, Dönitz explains the Nazi regime as a product of its time, but argues he was not a politician and thus not morally responsible for much of the regime's crimes. He likewise criticizes dictatorship as a fundamentally flawed form of government and blames it for much of the Nazi era's failings. Admiral Dönitz's second book, Mein wechselvolles Leben (My Ever-Changing Life) is less known, perhaps because it deals with the events of his life before 1934. This book was first published in 1968, and a new edition was released in 1998 with the revised title Mein soldatisches Leben (My Life as a Soldier). Late in his life, Dönitz made every attempt to answer correspondence and autograph postcards for others. Dönitz was unrepentant regarding his role in World War II since he firmly believed that no one will respect anyone who compromises with his belief or duty towards his nation in any way, whether his betrayal was small or big. Of this conviction, Dönitz writes (commenting on Himmler's peace negotiations): The betrayer of military secrets is a pariah, despised by every man and every nation. Even the enemy whom he serves has no respect for him, but merely uses him. Any nation which is not uncompromisingly unanimous in its condemnation of this type of treachery is undermining the very foundations of its own state, whatever its form of government may be. Dönitz lived out the rest of his life in relative obscurity in Aumühle, occasionally corresponding with American collectors of German Naval history, and died there of a heart attack on 24 December 1980. As the last German officer with the rank of Grand Admiral, he was honoured by many former servicemen and foreign naval officers who came to pay their respects at his funeral on 6 January 1981. However, he had only received the pension pay of a captain because the West German government ruled all of his advances in rank after that had been due to Hitler. He was buried in Waldfriedhof Cemetery in Aumühle without military honors, and soldiers were not allowed to wear uniforms to the funeral. |
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GERMAN LEADERSHIP
- 01 - Adolf Hitler
- 02 - Heinrich Himmler
- 03 - Martin Bormann
- 04 - Hermann Goering
- 05 - Joseph Goebbles
- 06 - Rudolf Hess
- 07 - Reinhard Heydrich
- 08 - Joachim Von Ribbentrop
- 09 - Erwin Rommel
- 10 - Albert Speer
- 11 - Wilhelm Keitel
- 12 - Erich Von Manstein
- 13 - Karl Dönitz
- 14 - Manfred Von Killinger
- 15 - Adolf Eichmann
- 16 - Alfred Jodl
- 17 - Albert Kesselring
- 18 - Walter Von Reichenau
- 19 - Werner Blomberg
- 20 - Franz Von Papen
- 21 - Wilhelm Canaris
- 22 - Konstantin Von Neurath
- 23 - Arthur Seyss-Inquart
- 24 - Franz Epp
- 25 - Hans Günther Von Kluge
- 26 - Joseph Dietrich
- 27 - Friedrich Paulus
- 28 - Ludwig Beck
HOLOCAUST TIMELINE
WORLD WAR II TIMELINE 1939
WORLD WAR II TIMELINE 1940
- 01 - World war II timeline - January 1940
- 02 - World war II timeline - February 1940
- 03 - World war II timeline - March 1940
- 04 - World war II timeline - April 1940
- 05 - World war II timeline - May 1940
- 06 - World war II timeline - June 1940
- 07 - World war II timeline - July 1940
- 08 - World war II timeline - August 1940
- 09 - World war II timeline - September 1940
- 10 - World war II timeline - October 1940
- 11 - World war II timeline - November 1940
- 12 - World war II timeline - December 1940
WORLD WAR II TIMELINE 1941
- 01 - World war II timeline - January 1941
- 02 - World war II timeline - February 1941
- 03 - World war II timeline - March 1941
- 04 - World war II timeline - April 1941
- 05 - World war II timeline - May 1941
- 06 - World war II timeline - June 1941
- 07 - World war II timeline - July 1941
- 08 - World war II timeline - August 1941
- 09 - World war II timeline - September 1941
- 10 - World war II timeline - October 1941
- 11 - World war II timeline - November 1941
- 12 - World war II timeline - December 1941
WORLD WAR II BATTLE
- Battle of Britain - 10 July – 31 October 1940
- Battle of El Alamein - 1 – 27 July 1942
- Battle of El Alamein - 23 October – 5 November 1942
- Battle of Kursk - 4 July - 23 August 1943
- Battle of Midway - 2 - 7 June 1942
- Battle of Monte Cassino - 17 January – 18 May 1944
- Battle of Okinawa - 1 April 1945 - 22 June 1945
- Battle of Sevastopol - 30 October 1941 - 4 July 1942
- Battle of Stalingrad - 17 July 1942 - 2 February 1943
WORLD WAR II OPERATION
ADOLF HITLER DIRECTIVES
- Directive No. 01 - For the conduct of the war 31 August 1939
- Directive No. 16 - On preparations for a landing operation against England 16 July 1940
- Directive No. 17 - For the conduct of air and naval warfare against England 1 August 1940
- Directive No. 18 - Undertaking Felix 12 November 1940
- Directive No. 19 - Undertaking Attila 10 December 1940
- Directive No. 20 - Undertaking Marita 13 December 1940
- Directive No. 21 - Operation Barbarossa 18 Decemmber 1940
- Directive No. 28 - Undertaking Mercury 25 April 1941
- Directive No. 29 - Proposed Military Government of Greece 17 May 1941
- Directive No. 30 - Middle east 23 May 1941
- Directive No. 32 - Operation Orient 14 July 1941
- Directive No. 33 - Continuation of the war in the east 19 July 1941
- Directive No. 40 - Competence of Commanders in Coastal Areas 23 March 1942
- Directive No. 42 - Instructions for operations against unoccupied France and the Iberian Peninsula 29 May 1942
- Directive No. 45 - Continuation of Operation Brunswick 23 July 1942
- Directive No. 51 - Preparations for a two-front war 3 November 1943
STATISTICS WORLD WAR II
ADOLF HITLER MEIN KAMPF VOLUME I
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 01 - In the home of my parents
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 02 - Years of study and suffering in Vienna
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 03 - Political reflections arising out of my sojorun in Vienna
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 04 - Munich
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 05 - The world war
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 06 - War propaganda
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 07 - The revolution
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 08 - The beginnings of my political activites
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 09 - The German worker's party
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 10 - Why the second Reich collapsed
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 11 - Race and people
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 12 - The first stage in the development of the German national
ADOLF HITLER MEIN KAMPF VOLUME II
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 01 - Philosophy and party
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 02 - The state
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 03 - Citizens and subjects of the state
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 04 - Personality and the ideal of the people's state
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 05 - Philosophy and organization
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 06 - The struggle of the early period
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 07 - The conflict with the red forces
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 08 - The strong is strongest when alone
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 09 - Fundamental ideas regarding the nature and organization of the strom troops
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 10 - The mask of federalism
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 11 - Propaganda and organization
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 12 - The problem of the trade unions
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 13 - The German post war policy of alliances
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 14 - Germany's policy in eastern Europe
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 15 - The right to self defence
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