George C. Marshall was born December 31, 1880 into a middle-class family in Uniontown, Pennsylvania, the son of George C. Marshall, Sr. and Laura Bradford Marshall.Marshall was a scion of an old Virginia family, as well as a distant relative of former Chief Justice John Marshall. Marshall graduated from the Virginia Military Institute (VMI),where he was initiated into the Kappa Alpha Order, in 1901. As Chief of Staff, Marshall organized the largest military expansion in U.S. history, inheriting an outmoded, poorly-equipped army of 189,000 men and, partly drawing from his experience teaching and developing techniques of modern warfare as an instructor at the Army War College, coordinated the large-scale expansion and modernization of the U. S. Army. Though he had never actually led troops in combat, Marshall was a skilled organizer with a talent for inspiring other officers.Many of the American generals who were given top commands during the war were either picked or recommended by Marshall, including Dwight Eisenhower, Lloyd Fredendall, Leslie McNair, Mark Wayne Clark and Omar Bradley. Faced with the necessity of turning an army of former civilians into a force of over eight million soldiers by 1942 (a fortyfold increase within three years), Marshall directed General Leslie McNair to focus efforts on rapidly producing large numbers of soldiers. With the exception of airborne forces, Marshall approved McNair's concept of an abbreviated training schedule for men entering Army land forces training, particularly in regards to basic infantry skills, weapons proficiency, and combat tactics.At the time, most U.S. commanders at lower levels had little or no combat experience of any kind; without the input of experienced British or Allied combat officers on the nature of modern warfare and enemy tactics, many of them resorted to formulaic training methods emphasizing static defense and orderly large-scale advances by motorized convoys over improved roads.In consequence, Army forces deploying to Africa suffered serious initial reverses when encountering German armored combat units in Africa at Kasserine Pass and other major battles.Even as late as 1944, U.S. soldiers undergoing stateside training in preparation for deployment against German forces in Europe were not being trained in combat procedures and tactics currently being employed there. Originally, Marshall had planned a 200-division Army with a system of unit rotation such as practiced by the British and other Allies.By mid-1943, however, after pressure from government and business leaders to preserve manpower for industry and agriculture, he had abandoned this plan in favor of a 90-division Army using individual replacements sent via a circuitous process from training to divisions in combat.The individual replacement system (IRS) devised by Marshall and implemented by McNair greatly exacerbated problems with unit cohesion and effective transfer of combat experience to newly-trained soldiers and officers.In Europe, where there were few pauses in combat with German forces, the individual replacement system had broken down completely by late 1944.Hastily-trained replacements or service personnel re-assigned as infantry were given six weeks' refresher training and thrown into battle with Army divisions locked in front-line combat. The new men were often not even proficient in the use of their own rifle or weapons system, and once in combat, could not receive enough practical instruction from veterans before being killed or wounded, usually within the first three or four days.Under such conditions, many replacements suffered a crippling loss of morale, while veteran soldiers were kept in line units until they were killed, wounded, or incapacitated by battle fatigue or physical illness. Incidents of soldiers AWOL from combat duty as well as battle fatigue and self-inflicted injury rose rapidly during the last eight months of the war with Germany.As one historian later concluded, "Had the Germans been given a free hand to devise a replacement system ..., one that would do the Americans the most harm and the least good, they could not have done a better job." Marshall's abilities to pick competent field commanders during the early part of the war was decidedly mixed. While he had been instrumental in advancing the career of the able Dwight D. Eisenhower, he had also recommended the swaggering Lloyd Fredendall to Eisenhower for a major command in the American invasion of North Africa during Operation Torch. Marshall was especially fond of Fredendall, describing him as "one of the best" and remarking in a staff meeting when his name was mentioned, "I like that man; you can see determination all over his face." Eisenhower duly picked him to command the 39,000-man Central Task Force (the largest of three) in Operation Torch. Both men would later come to regret that decision after the U.S. Army debacle at Kasserine Pass. During World War II, Marshall was instrumental in preparing the U.S. Army and Army Air Forces for the invasion of the European continent. Marshall wrote the document that would become the central strategy for all Allied operations in Europe. He initially scheduled Operation Overlord for 1 April 1943, but met with strong opposition from Winston Churchill, who convinced Roosevelt to commit troops to Operation Husky for the invasion of Italy. Some authors think that WWII could have been terminated one year earlier if Marshall had had his way, others think that such invasion would have meant utter failure. But it is true that the German Army in 1943 was overstretched and defense works in Normandy were not ready.[citation needed] It was assumed that Marshall would become the Supreme Commander of Operation Overlord, but Roosevelt selected Dwight Eisenhower as Supreme Commander. While Marshall enjoyed considerable success in working with Congress and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, he refused to lobby for the position. President Roosevelt didn't want to lose his presence in the states. He told Marshall, "I didn't feel I could sleep at ease if you were out of Washington."When rumors circulated that the top job would go to Marshall, many critics viewed the transfer as a demotion for Marshall, since he would leave his position as Chief of Staff of the Army and lose his seat on the Combined Chiefs of Staff. On December 16, 1944, Marshall became the first American general to be promoted to 5 star rank, the newly created General of the Army. He was the second American to be promoted to a 5 star rank, as William Leahy was promoted to fleet admiral the previous day. This position is the American equivalent rank to field marshal. Throughout the remainder of World War II, Marshall coordinated Allied operations in Europe and the Pacific. He was characterized as the organizer of Allied victory by Winston Churchill. Time Magazine named Marshall Man of the Year for 1943. Marshall resigned his post of Chief of Staff in 1945, but did not retire, as regulations stipulate that Generals of the Army remain on active duty for life. After World War II ended, the Congressional Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack received testimony on the intelligence failure. It amassed 25,000 pages of documents, 40 volumes, and included nine reports and investigations, eight of which had been previously completed. Among these documents was a report critical of Marshall for his delay in sending General Walter Short, the Army commander in Hawaii, important information concerning a possible attack on December 6 and 7. The report also criticized Marshall’s admitted lack of knowledge of the readiness of the Hawaiian Command during November and December 1941. Ten days after the attack Lt. General Short and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, commander of the Navy at Pearl Harbor, were both relieved of their duties. The final report of the Joint Committee did not single out and fault Marshall. While the report was critical of the overall situation, the committee noted that subordinates had failed to pass on important information to their superiors, including Marshall. The report noted that once General Marshall received information about the impending attack, he immediately passed it on. Marshall died on Friday October 16, 1959. He is buried at Arlington National Cemetery. After leaving office, in a television interview, Harry Truman was asked who he thought was the American who made the greatest contribution of the last thirty years. Without hesitation, Truman picked Marshall, adding "I don't think in this age in which I have lived, that there has been a man who has been a greater administrator; a man with a knowledge of military affairs equal to General Marshall." In spite of world-wide acclaim, dozens of national and international awards and honors and the Nobel Peace prize, public opinion became bitterly divided along party lines on Marshall's record. While campaigning for president in 1952, Eisenhower denounced the Truman administration's failures in Korea, campaigned alongside McCarthy, and refused to defend Marshall's policies. Marshall, who assisted Eisenhower in his promotions, and stood aside, turning down the opportunity to command the allied forces to allow Eisenhower to take that role, was surprised at the lack of a positive statement supporting him from Eisenhower during the McCarthy hearings. |
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GERMAN LEADERSHIP
- 01 - Adolf Hitler
- 02 - Heinrich Himmler
- 03 - Martin Bormann
- 04 - Hermann Goering
- 05 - Joseph Goebbles
- 06 - Rudolf Hess
- 07 - Reinhard Heydrich
- 08 - Joachim Von Ribbentrop
- 09 - Erwin Rommel
- 10 - Albert Speer
- 11 - Wilhelm Keitel
- 12 - Erich Von Manstein
- 13 - Karl Dönitz
- 14 - Manfred Von Killinger
- 15 - Adolf Eichmann
- 16 - Alfred Jodl
- 17 - Albert Kesselring
- 18 - Walter Von Reichenau
- 19 - Werner Blomberg
- 20 - Franz Von Papen
- 21 - Wilhelm Canaris
- 22 - Konstantin Von Neurath
- 23 - Arthur Seyss-Inquart
- 24 - Franz Epp
- 25 - Hans Günther Von Kluge
- 26 - Joseph Dietrich
- 27 - Friedrich Paulus
- 28 - Ludwig Beck
HOLOCAUST TIMELINE
WORLD WAR II TIMELINE 1939
WORLD WAR II TIMELINE 1940
- 01 - World war II timeline - January 1940
- 02 - World war II timeline - February 1940
- 03 - World war II timeline - March 1940
- 04 - World war II timeline - April 1940
- 05 - World war II timeline - May 1940
- 06 - World war II timeline - June 1940
- 07 - World war II timeline - July 1940
- 08 - World war II timeline - August 1940
- 09 - World war II timeline - September 1940
- 10 - World war II timeline - October 1940
- 11 - World war II timeline - November 1940
- 12 - World war II timeline - December 1940
WORLD WAR II TIMELINE 1941
- 01 - World war II timeline - January 1941
- 02 - World war II timeline - February 1941
- 03 - World war II timeline - March 1941
- 04 - World war II timeline - April 1941
- 05 - World war II timeline - May 1941
- 06 - World war II timeline - June 1941
- 07 - World war II timeline - July 1941
- 08 - World war II timeline - August 1941
- 09 - World war II timeline - September 1941
- 10 - World war II timeline - October 1941
- 11 - World war II timeline - November 1941
- 12 - World war II timeline - December 1941
WORLD WAR II BATTLE
- Battle of Britain - 10 July – 31 October 1940
- Battle of El Alamein - 1 – 27 July 1942
- Battle of El Alamein - 23 October – 5 November 1942
- Battle of Kursk - 4 July - 23 August 1943
- Battle of Midway - 2 - 7 June 1942
- Battle of Monte Cassino - 17 January – 18 May 1944
- Battle of Okinawa - 1 April 1945 - 22 June 1945
- Battle of Sevastopol - 30 October 1941 - 4 July 1942
- Battle of Stalingrad - 17 July 1942 - 2 February 1943
WORLD WAR II OPERATION
ADOLF HITLER DIRECTIVES
- Directive No. 01 - For the conduct of the war 31 August 1939
- Directive No. 16 - On preparations for a landing operation against England 16 July 1940
- Directive No. 17 - For the conduct of air and naval warfare against England 1 August 1940
- Directive No. 18 - Undertaking Felix 12 November 1940
- Directive No. 19 - Undertaking Attila 10 December 1940
- Directive No. 20 - Undertaking Marita 13 December 1940
- Directive No. 21 - Operation Barbarossa 18 Decemmber 1940
- Directive No. 28 - Undertaking Mercury 25 April 1941
- Directive No. 29 - Proposed Military Government of Greece 17 May 1941
- Directive No. 30 - Middle east 23 May 1941
- Directive No. 32 - Operation Orient 14 July 1941
- Directive No. 33 - Continuation of the war in the east 19 July 1941
- Directive No. 40 - Competence of Commanders in Coastal Areas 23 March 1942
- Directive No. 42 - Instructions for operations against unoccupied France and the Iberian Peninsula 29 May 1942
- Directive No. 45 - Continuation of Operation Brunswick 23 July 1942
- Directive No. 51 - Preparations for a two-front war 3 November 1943
STATISTICS WORLD WAR II
ADOLF HITLER MEIN KAMPF VOLUME I
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 01 - In the home of my parents
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 02 - Years of study and suffering in Vienna
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 03 - Political reflections arising out of my sojorun in Vienna
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 04 - Munich
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 05 - The world war
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 06 - War propaganda
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 07 - The revolution
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 08 - The beginnings of my political activites
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 09 - The German worker's party
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 10 - Why the second Reich collapsed
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 11 - Race and people
- Mein kampf - Volume I - Chapter - 12 - The first stage in the development of the German national
ADOLF HITLER MEIN KAMPF VOLUME II
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 01 - Philosophy and party
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 02 - The state
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 03 - Citizens and subjects of the state
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 04 - Personality and the ideal of the people's state
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 05 - Philosophy and organization
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 06 - The struggle of the early period
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 07 - The conflict with the red forces
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 08 - The strong is strongest when alone
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 09 - Fundamental ideas regarding the nature and organization of the strom troops
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 10 - The mask of federalism
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 11 - Propaganda and organization
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 12 - The problem of the trade unions
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 13 - The German post war policy of alliances
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 14 - Germany's policy in eastern Europe
- Mein kampf - Volume II - Chapter - 15 - The right to self defence
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