Friedrich Paulus

Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst Paulus was born in September 1890, near Breitenau, a little country town deep in Hesse, Germany. Paulus, the son of a school teacher, tried unsucessfully to secure a cadetship in the German navy. He later briefly studied law at Marburg University, but he soon left when recruited into the German Army in 1910. The following year he was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the 3rd Baden Infantry Regiment. He married Elena Rosetti-Solescu, a beautiful young woman one year his senior, who came from a wealthy and aristocratic Romanian family, in July 1912. By the outbreak of WWI, Paulus was adjutant of his Regiment's 3rd Battalion which took part in the thrust into France, seeing action in the Vosges and around Arras during 1914. Paulus had to leave the front in November because of illness and following this his next posting was as Regimental Staff Officer to the 2nd Prussian Jager Regiment. Paulus was later moved to Corps headquarters, having reached the rank of captain. His Corps served in Romania and Macedonia in 1915 and in early 1916 in the later stages of the Battle of Verdun. Its final major action was during the spring of 1918 on the Somme. Following the end of the war, Paulus remained in the scaled down Reichswehr and was assigned to the 13th Infantry Regiment as a Company commander. However Paulus spent more time engaged on Staff duties than with troops and following one exercise his superiors noted: 'This officer lacks decisiveness.' His commanding officer also remarked: 'A typical staff officer of the old school....modest, perhaps too modest, amiable, with extremely courteous manners and a good comrade. Anxious not to offend anyone.' In 1922 he was given general staff training and the following year joined Army Group 2 at Kassel. From 1924 to 1927 he was a General Staff officer with Wehrkreis V at Stuttgart. One senior officer commented that Paulus was, 'slow, but very methodical'. However, his promotion continued and in 1930 he became a tactics instructor with the 5th Infantry Division. In 1934 Paulus was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and appointed commander of Motor Transport Section 3. In September 1935, Paulus succeeded Heinz Guderian as Chief of Staff to the commander of Germany's Mechanised Forces. Considered to be an expert on motorised warfare, Paulus was promoted to Major General and became director of training for Germany's four light divisions in 1939. Just before the outbreak of the Second World War Paulus became Chief of Staff for 10th Army. Serving under General Walther Von Reichenau, Paulus and Reichenau enjoyed a close professional relationship. While Reichenau hated routine and detail and preferred to be with his forward units, Paulus was an excellent Staff Officer and administered everything faultlessly. Paulus distinguished himself as an effective and conscientious Chief of Staff during the Polish campaign in September 1939. Then in May 1940, 6th Army advanced across the narrow neck of lower Holland and then into Belgium. Paulus was present when Reichenau and King Leopold signed the terms of surrender of the Belgian Army on 28th May. In June 1940, Paulus was promoted to Lieutenant General and became Chief Quartermaster of the Army. In September Paulus became Deputy Chief of Staff and Chief of the Operations Section at OKH. Paulus's fastideous habits earned him some notoriety. He habitually wore gloves, not just because of his taste for military swank but because he detested dirt. Throughout his career, Paulus took pains to bathe and change his uniform twice a day. Because of his cleanly splendor, certain officers sarcastically dubbed him 'The Noble Lord' or 'Our Most Elegant Gentleman.' During his time in this post Paulus helped prepare the plans for Operation Sealion, the seaborne invasion of England. Later he carried out a strategic survey of Russia for the forthcoming operation Barbarossa. The main advice given by Paulus to Hitler was to make sure that after the invasion the Red Army was not to be allowed to retreat into the interior. For the campaign to be successful, he argued for battles of encirclement. He also suggested that the main thrust should be made north of the Pripyat Marshes, in order to capture Moscow at the earliest opportunity. Throughout the planning, Paulus never raised any moral objections about attacking a country with whom Germany had a non-aggression pact. But his aristocratic Romanian wife Elena, who had voiced her staunch opposition to the invasion of Poland, also objected to that of Russia. Paulus's view was that political matters were not his concern and that being a soldier, he must follow the Fuhrer's orders. He did later however, while commander of 6th Army, rescind the infamous commissar order and forbade its demands being carried out. In August 1941, Paulus was sent on a tour of the various headquarters in Russia, to assess on behalf of OKH, the competing claims for resources by their commanders. Before leaving his post, Reichenau suggested to Hitler that his old colleague, Von Paulus, should become the new commander of 6th Army, rather than one of the experienced front-line Corps commanders. Hitler agreed and on the 5th of January 1942, following his promotion to General, Paulus took up his appointment. His Chief of Staff, General Schmidt, was an outstanding tactician, energetic and hardened. However his stronger personality often allowed him to dominate Paulus's thinking. Despite this the two shared an unshakeable belief in their Fuhrer and an almost total obedience to him, despite the demands of their own conscience. On the 9th of May 1942, a large Russian force launched an offensive to break out of the Lozovaya salient and capture Kharkov. Two of the Russian Armies, the 28th and 57th ran straight into 6th Army and became embroiled in heavy fighting around Volchansk. Paulus was forced onto the defensive and was pushed back to the line of the Kharkov-Belgorod railway, where he managed to halt the Russian advance and inflict heavy losses. By the 19th, Paulus had moved his two Panzer Corps to his right flank where they pushed south in to the rear of the Russian penetration. They linked up with Kleist's Panzers at Balakleya on the 23rd, completing the encirclement of two Russian Armies, the 6th and the 9th. Following the destruction of the pocket, which was completed by the 30th May, Paulus was awarded the Knight's Cross and received favourable publicity at home. The German summer offensive proper began on June 28th. Paulus's 6th Army had reached the Don River at Voronezh by the 5th of July. The city was bypassed and the virtually undefended Don crossings were captured. The advance continued to progress rapidly as Russian forces retreated eastwards. By the 25th, the Chir River was reached and the Russian 62nd Army was encountered. 6th Army became embroiled in heavy fighting to force the enemy out of the Don Bend. The Army was forced to halt during the first week in August in order for elements of 4th Panzer Army to catch up from the south. Paulus also contracted dysentery but continued to perform his duties efficiently. The 19th of August saw the advance towards Stalingrad resume. Paulus had initiated an attack to envelop the two Russian Armies standing before the city, the 62nd and 64th. The forces of 4th Panzer Army became bogged down in heavy fighting around Abganerovo, south of the city and Paulus's advance was continually hampered by fuel shortages, allowing the bulk of the Russian Armies to escape into the city. Paulus decided to delay the attack on the city proper, until the 7th of September. As his forces advanced into Stalingrad, the Russians fought for every building and casualties increased dramatically. On the 12th of September Paulus flew out of Stalingrad and with Von Weichs, his Army commander, visited Hitler at his HQ in Vinniza. There he adamantly pointed out the dangers arising from his overextended and weakly protected northern flank and his poor supply situation. However in his memoirs he retorts: 'To all my requests, suggestions and calculations with regard to reinforcements, adequate flank protection and supply, the reaction by higher authorities was totally insufficient.' On the 26th of September, 6th Army was able to raise the German flag over the government buildings in Red Square, but the street fighting continued. Hitler now ordered Paulus to take Stalingrad whatever the cost to German forces. In a radio broadcast Hitler told the German people, 'You may rest assured that nobody will ever drive us out of Stalingrad.' When General Von Wietersheim, commander of the XIV Panzer Corps, complained about the high casualty rates his Corps was suffering, Paulus promptly replaced him with General Hans Hube. Paulus continued to make progress and by the beginning of November German forces occupied almost 90% of the city and had reached the Volga, both north and south of the city. However, his men were now running short of ammunition and food. Despite these problems Paulus decided to order another major offensive on the 10th of November. Throughout November, Paulus, through his staff, repeatedly advised the high command of the highly menacing preparations the enemy were making for a major offensive against the German forces surrounding Stalingrad. However the high command chose to ignore the warnings. The Russians launched their offensive on the 19th of November, named operation Uranus. The attacks fell on weakly held sectors north and south of the city, manned mainly by Romanian forces in the north and by a mixture of Romanians and units of the 4th Panzer Army in the south. Decisive action now could have saved the situation. If Paulus had acted boldly, sending some units north and south to hold the Russians while withdrawing the bulk of his force from the ruins of Stalingrad, then much of his army would have been saved. On the 21st, Paulus recommended to Von Weichs at Army Group, that he be allowed to withdraw the endangered Army to an arc on the Don and the Chir Rivers. Having initially supported such an immediate breakout, Von Weichs failed to act and the same evening passed on an instruction from OKH that Paulus was to hold the position on the Volga at all costs and that countermeasures to restore the situation were being implemented by the Fuhrer. In the meantime the Army would be supplied by air. Senior officers under Paulus argued that they doubted if the scale of the airlift required could be achieved during a Russian winter. General Fiebig had informed Paulus and his Chief of Staff Schmidt, 'Supplying a whole Army by air? Impossible! I warn you against entertaining such exaggerated expectations!' All of his Corps commanders argued for a breakout before the Red Army was able to consolidate its positions. General Hans Hube told Paulus: 'A breakout is our only chance.' Paulus remarks in his memoirs that 'In this situation, my acting against orders, particularly since I could not responsibly oversee the overall situation, would have pulled the operational foundation from under the supreme command. Such a course of action, against the plans of the overall leadership, leads to anarchy in the command structure.' However, perhaps the uniqueness of the situation required someone to take such a course of action. In addition Paulus was suffering continuing dysentery and a general rundown in health, but despite being urged to take sick leave in Germany, he refused. On the 17th of December, Von Manstein gave the order for Paulus to breakout towards the forces of 57th Panzer Corps, which had fought its way to within 30 miles of the pocket. However Hitler had ordered that he was expected to both break out and establish a supply corridor, whilst still holding his positions within the city. Paulus rejected the order, arguing that his men were too weak to make such a move and that his vehicles had insufficient fuel to reach the relieving forces. On the 19th of December, Von Manstein sent an emissary, Major Eismann, into the pocket by air to urge Paulus to do all he could to attempt a break-out and meet the relief force. It was the last chance for Paulus, but in the end he refused to move, quoting Hitler's orders that the present positions at Stalingrad should be held. He told Eismann, 'Thunderclap, (the code name for a complete breakout) is a catastrophe solution that should be avoided if at all possible.' Paulus was awarded the Oakleaves of the Knight's Cross on the 15th of January. Two weeks later, on the 30th of January Paulus was promoted to Field Marshal and in a message from Hitler was reminded that no German Field Marshal had ever been captured. Hitler was clearly suggesting that Paulus commit suicide, but he declined. On the morning of 31st January, Russian forces reached the building in which Paulus had his headquarters. A young Russian officer entered the room and demanded, on behalf of his superiors, that the Germans surrender. After much parleying with Paulus's staff, the Russian was finally led to Paulus, who was lying listlessly on a bed. Through an interpreter the Russian officer demanded the surrender of 6th Army, Paulus merely nodded. Paulus was taken into custody and at first refused to co-operate with the Russian authorities, making no effort to negotiate a surrender for the remaining elements of the Army still trapped and fighting in the northern pocket. However, after he discovered that his friends, Erich Hopner and Erwin von Witzleben, had been executed, following the attempted assassination of Hitler in July 1944, he finally gave his support to the German Officers League, formed by Von Seydlitz. In this capacity he recorded anti-Nazi radio broadcasts, including calls for German officers to desert or to disobey Hitler's orders. As a result of these broadcasts Hitler ordered that Paulus's entire family should be imprisoned. Paulus's wife was urged to renounce his name, but she refused. His surviving son was detained, but survived the war. His other son, Friedrich, was killed in February 1944 at the Anzio beachhead in Italy. Paulus never saw his wife again as during his time in captivity she died in West Germany in 1949. In 1946 Paulus appeared at Nuremberg as a witness for the prosecution. Although he admitted he had been guilty of a criminal attack on the Soviet Union he refused to incriminate Alfred Jodl or Wilhelm Keitel. Paulus remained in a Soviet Union prison until being released in 1953. He settled in Dresden, East Germany, where he worked as an inspector of the People's Police. Friedrich Paulus died of cancer on 1st February, 1957.