Battle of Kursk - 4 July - 23 August 1943

The Battle of Kursk refers to German and Soviet operations on the Eastern Front of World War II in the vicinity of the city of Kursk (approx. 270 miles/435 km south of Moscow) in the Soviet Union in July and August 1943. It remains both the largest series of armoured clashes, including the Battle of Prokhorovka, and the costliest single day of aerial warfare. It was the last strategic offensive the Germans were able to mount in the east. The resulting decisive Soviet victory gave the Red Army the strategic initiative for the rest of the war. The Germans hoped to shorten their lines by eliminating the Kursk salient (also known as the Kursk bulge), created in the aftermath of their defeat at the Battle of Stalingrad. They envisioned pincers breaking through its northern and southern flanks to achieve a great encirclement of Red Army forces. However, the Soviets had excellent intelligence of Adolf Hitler's intentions. This and German delays to wait for new weapons, mainly Tiger and Panther tanks,gave the Red Army more than enough time to construct a purpose-built, massively redundant and carefully constructed series of defense lines and position large reserve forces for a strategic counterattack. Although often thought of primarily as a tank battle, Kursk as a whole actually clearly demonstrated the triumph of engineers, infantry and artillery over superior armored forces when utilized as part of a massively redundant strategy of defense in depth. The Soviet plan was to rapidly grind down the German panzer spearheads in a colossal interconnected web of minefields, defensive strongpoints and concealed anti-tank guns comprising 8 progressively spaced defense lines. Collectively, the defensive works around Kursk formed a contiguous and essentially impenetrable belt over 250 kilometers deep——more than 10 times deeper than the vaunted Maginot Line——and with a better than 1:1 ratio of AT guns to attacking German tanks, making it by far the most powerful defensive line ever constructed and (as it turned out) more than three times the depth that was eventually required to blunt the German attack. When the German forces had exhausted themselves against the defence-in-depth, the Soviets responded with their own counteroffensives, which allowed the Red Army to retake Orel and Belgorod on 5 August and Kharkov on 23 August, and push back the Germans across a broad front. Though the Red Army had had success in winter, this was the first successful strategic Soviet summer offensive of the war. The model strategic operation earned a place in war college curricula.The Battle of Kursk was the first battle in which a Blitzkrieg offensive had been defeated before it could break through enemy defences and into its strategic depths. In the winter of 1942–43, the Red Army conclusively won the Battle of Stalingrad. About 800,000 German and other Axis troops were lost, including the entire German Sixth Army, seriously depleting Axis strength in the east. In 1917, the Germans had built the famous Hindenburg Line on the Western Front, shortening their lines and thereby strengthening their defense. They planned on repeating this strategy in the USSR and started construction of a massive series of defensive works known as the Panther-Wotan line. They intended to retreat to the line late in 1943 and bleed the Soviets against it while their own forces recuperated. In February and March 1943, German Field Marshal Erich von Manstein won the Third Battle of Kharkov, leaving the front line running roughly from Leningrad in the north to Rostov in the south. In the middle lay a large 200 km (120 mi) wide and 150 km (90 mi) deep Soviet-held salient, or bulge, in the lines between German forward positions near Orel in the north, and Kharkov in the south. Most of the German front commanders agreed a defensive stance should be the priority, to contain Soviet offensives and deliver counter blows. Hitler accepted this advice. Erich von Manstein insisted a first strike was still an option and an offensive to pinch out the Soviet bulge at Kursk would be achievable before moving further south to recover more lost territory. Manstein wanted to attack in May but owing to the poor tank strength of the German Army, Hitler delayed until July when newer tanks minimized the risk of defeat. The High Command (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht or OKW) hoped to regain the initiative on the Eastern Front. German plans Manstein pressed for a new offensive along the same lines he had successfully pursued at Kharkov, where he had cut off an overextended Red Army offensive. He suggested tricking the Red Army into attacking in the south against the desperately re-forming Sixth Army, leading them into the Donets Basin in eastern Ukraine. He would then turn south from Kharkov on the eastern side of the Donets River towards Rostov and trap the entire southern wing of the Red Army against the Sea of Azov. German Army High Command (OKH) did not approve of Manstein's plan and instead turned their attention to the obvious bulge in the lines between Orel and Kharkov. Two Red Army Fronts, the Voronezh and Central Fronts, occupied the ground in and around the salient and pinching it off would trap almost a fifth of the Red Army's manpower. It would also result in a much straighter and shorter line and recapture the strategically useful railway city of Kursk, located on the main north-south railway line from Rostov to Moscow. In March, the plans crystallized. Walter Model's 9th Army would attack southwards from Orel while Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment "Kempf" under the overall command of Manstein would attack northwards from Kharkov. They planned to meet near Kursk but if the offensive went well, they would have permission to continue forward on their own initiative, with a general plan to re-establish a new line at the Don River, several weeks' march to the east. Contrary to his recent behavior, Hitler gave the OKH considerable control over the planning of the operation. Over the next few weeks, they continued to increase the scope of the forces attached to the front, stripping other areas of the German line of anything useful for deployment in the operation. They first set the attack for 4 May, but delayed in order to allow more time for new weapons to arrive from Germany, especially the new Tiger and Panther tanks. Hitler postponed the offensive several more times. On 5 May, the launch date became 12 June. Due to the potential threat of an Allied landing in Italy and delays in armour deliveries, Hitler set the launch date to 20 June. On 17 June, he further postponed it until 3 July, and then later to 5 July. The concept behind the German offensive was the traditional (and for the Germans usually successful) double-envelopment, or Kesselschlacht (cauldron battle). The German Army had long favored such a Cannae-style method and the tools of Blitzkrieg made these types of tactics even more effective. Blitzkrieg depended on mass, shock, and speed to surprise an enemy and defeat him through disruption of command and supply rather than by destroying all his forces in a pitched battle. Such breakthroughs were easier to achieve by attacking in unexpected locations, as the Germans had done in the Ardennes in 1940, Kiev in 1941 and towards Stalingrad and the Caucasus in 1942. The OKH's plan for the attack on the Kursk salient, "Operation Citadel", violated the principle of surprise: anyone with a basic grasp of military strategy could deduce that the Kursk salient was the most obvious target for a potential German attack. A number of German commanders questioned the idea, notably Guderian, who asked Hitler: " Was it really necessary to attack Kursk,and indeend in the east that year at all ?Do yuo think anyone even knows where Kursk is ?The entire world doesn't care if we capture Kursk or not.What is the reason that is forcing us to attack this year on Kursk,or even more,on the eastern front ?" Perhaps more surprisingly,Adolf Hitler replied: "I know.The thought of i turns my stomach." The German force numbered fifty divisions, including 17 Panzer and Panzergrenadiere, among them the elite Wehrmacht Großdeutschland Division as well as Waffen-SS divisions 1st SS PzGrenDiv Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler, 2nd SS PzGrenDiv Das Reich and 3rd SS PzGrenDiv Totenkopf grouped into the II SS Panzer Corps. The High Command concentrated all their armor, the Tiger and new Panther tanks and the new Ferdinand tank destroyer, being used as assault guns. They massed a high proportion of their available air units and artillery; there was also a formidable concentration of armor. The German deception plan included defensive-sounding names for major formations. For example, the 9.Armee was given the name "Festungsstab II", Fortress Staff II. Model ordered that recordings were to be made of massed German tanks' engines. This noise was to be played on loudspeakers to confuse the Soviets as to the whereabouts of German armour concentrations.Many German AFVs were painted with new divisional insignia used only for this campaign. These deception measures were generally unsuccessful. Soviet plans The Red Army had also begun planning their summer offensives, and had settled on a plan that mirrored that of the Germans. Attacks in front of Orel and Kharkov would flatten the line and potentially lead to a breakout near the Pripyat Marshes. Soviet commanders had considerable concerns over the German plans. The locations of all previous German attacks had caught the Red Army by surprise but in this case, Kursk seemed the obvious target. Moscow received warning of the German plans through the Lucy spy ring in Switzerland. Marshal Georgiy Zhukov had already predicted the site of the German attack as early as 8 April, when he wrote his initial report to Stavka (the Red Army General Staff), in which he also recommended the strategy eventually followed by the Red Army. Anastas Mikoyan wrote in his memoirs that he was notified about the attack in general details by Stalin on 27 March. The pattern of the war up until this point had been one of German offensive success. Blitzkrieg had worked against all opponents, including the Red Army. On the other hand, Soviet results during both winters had shown that their own offensives were now effective. Stalin and some Stavka officers wanted to strike first. The overwhelming majority of Stavka, most notably Zhukov, advised waiting for the Germans to exhaust themselves. Zhukov wrote in a letter to Stalin on 8 April 1943: I consider it inadvisable for our forces to go over to the offensive in the very first days of the campaign in order to forestall the enemy. It would be better to make the enemy exhaust himself against our defences, and knock out his tanks and then, bringing up fresh reserves, to go over to the general offensive which would finally finish off his main force. The German delay in launching their offensive gave the Red Army four months in which to turn the salient into one of the most heavily defended areas in history. Two fronts, the Central and Voronezh, manned the defensive lines and the Steppe Front was available as a reserve. The Red Army and thousands of civilians laid about one million land mines and dug about 5000 km (3000 mi) of trenches, to a depth of 175 km (95 mi. They massed a huge army, including some 1,300,000 men, 3,600 tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces and 2,792 aircraft. This amounted to 26% of the total manpower of the Red Army, 26% of its mortars and artillery, 35% of its aircraft and 46% of its tanks.Due to the disparity in population size, industrial capability and continual German delays in tank production, the Red Army could build up forces faster than the Germans; each month they pulled further ahead in men and matériel. The Germans received reports of rapid and powerful Soviet concentrations in the Kursk area and delayed the offensive to allow for more Panther tanks to reach the front line. Many of the forces assigned to the defense of the salient were recent veterans of the Battle of Stalingrad but the Red Army also added over one million new men in the first half of 1943. Thus the Red Army was larger than in 1942, even after the losses at Stalingrad. The long delay between the identification of the likely site of the German attack and the beginning of the offensive gave the new units an unusually long time to train. The density of artillery in the salient was unusual; there were more artillery regiments in the salient than infantry regiments. The Red Army was determined to grind down attacking German units with a combination of mines and artillery fire. Indirect fire from howitzers would stop the German infantry, while direct fire from 45mm, 57mm, and 85 mm towed anti-tank guns and 76.2mm divisional field guns would destroy the tanks. In the 13th Army sector (facing the German 9th Army on the northern face of the salient) the density of anti-tank guns was 23.7 guns per kilometre of defended front. In the 6th and 7th Guards Army sectors in the south the density was lower, with about 10 guns per kilometre. The preparation of the battlefield by Red Army military engineers was thorough. Reports indicate 503,993 anti-tank mines and 439,348 anti-personnel mines were laid in the defended area. On average, 1,500 anti-tank and 1,700 anti-personnel mines were laid per kilometre of front. In the sectors eventually attacked, densities were never lower than 1,400 per kilometre and sometimes reached as high as 2,000 per kilometre. Red Army engineers also constructed miles of trenches, laid barbed wire, built anti-tank obstacles, and constructed thousands of gun and mortar positions. Like the intended German deceptions, the Soviet deception plans were elaborate. Unlike the German plans, however, the Soviet ruses were generally successful. Dummy positions were constructed and dummy aircraft were placed on false airfields and false radio traffic sent to confuse German intelligence. Camouflaging of actual positions and minefields was excellent; the first warning most German units had of the presence of Soviet minefields or dug-in guns was their own vehicles exploding. The Red Air Force (VVS) had lost over 36,900 aircraft in 1941-1942. The Soviet aircraft industry was able to replace losses in machines and had now rearmed, while dispensing with obsolete types such as the I-16, MiG-3 and the LaGG-3. The most widely used Soviet fighters in the Kursk battle were the Yak-1, Yak-7B and La-5. The La 5FN was considered to be a match for both the Bf 109 and Fw 190.Pilot training was short and lacked thoroughness. The 13,383 Soviet pilots who were trained in 1942 received 13–15 flight hours before combat. Shturmovik and bomber pilots received just 18 and 15 hours respectively. Of the Soviet bomber and ground attack units, just seven percent of its pilots had seen action prior to Kursk.Most Soviet pilots were forced to train on the aircraft they would fly in combat. As a result the Soviets lost 10,600 aircraft to training accidents up until the summer of 1943.At senior command, the Soviets possessed highly skilled leaders such as Colonel General Aleksandr Novikov, Commander-in-Chief of the VVS in the Kursk region. A lack of experience at lower levels led to costly losses. In the aftermath of Kursk, Soviet aviation rapidly improved its coordination with ground forces. Its pilots also received a rapidly improving training program. As a result, the Soviets were able to build the Red Banner units of highly skilled fighter pilots. Just six months after Kursk, the ratio of Soviet to German aircraft losses had changed from 4:1 to 3:2. German attack Von Manstein's troops in the south were better equipped than Model's in the north. The 4th Tank Army and Armygroup Kempf had 1,377 tanks while the 9th Army possessed 988 tanks.The 1,377 tanks included 102 Panzer VI and 200 Panzer V. The 4th Tank Army (Hoth) attacked in two directions with the XLVIII Panzer Corps and the II SS Panzer Corps. The flanks of the spearheads were protected by the LII Corps on the left and by Armygroup Kempf on the right. The XLVIII Tank Corps was to be the lead spearhead so they were reinforced with 200 Panthers. Their opponent was the Voronezh Front. At 4:00 AM the attack began; nearly all units advanced with good speed despite encountering well prepared defensive positions and minefields. Manstein's tanks were much more successful than their northern counterparts. The main reason for this was his better use of tanks in concentrated spearheads.In the south the Red Army had not been able to pinpoint the German attack sectors; this forced them to spread out their defenses evenly. Three of the four armies of the Voronezh Front had about 10 antitank guns per kilometre of front; this contrasts with the Central Front's distribution of guns, which was twice as heavy in the active sectors. The Voronezh Front made the decision to hold the tactical zone thinly, leaving a higher proportion of units in deeper positions compared to the Central Front. The Voronezh Front was weaker than the Central Front, and it faced much stronger German forces. The new Panther tanks failed to perform to expectations, as they proved to be unreliable. When the new tanks moved into their assembly areas, 45 out of 200 experienced mechanical problems requiring repair.When the remaining Panthers launched their attack they immediately ran onto a minefield and many tanks were immobilised. In the first two days the II SS Tank Corps penetrated 25 km deep into the Russian lines and took Jakovlevo. The 200 Panthers of XLVIII Tank Corps to the left spent more time in the workshops than fighting the enemy. Armygroup Kempf, which was to assist the II SS Tank Corps, was outnumbered and had problems crossing the Donec. The steady progress of the German units forced the Russian leaders to commit some of their strategic reserves, as nearly all operational reserves were in action. The Steppe Front had been formed in the months prior to the operation as a central reserve. As early as 6 July Stavka decided to send the II, X Tank corps and the 5th Guards Tank Army to the southern sector; a day later other formations got their marching orders. Vatutin planned an operational counterstrike against the German units but decided to cancel it after the failure of the northern counter-attack. Instead of seeking open battle against the German tanks Vatutin let his tanks dig in as Rokossovskiy did in the north.Zhukov protested against this use of the tanks but Vatutin's decision stood. German officers reported that they were slowed down by the Schweigepanzer (silent tanks), because it cost much time to overcome these camouflaged "bases".Despite the order to dig in many of their tanks, enough tanks remained to launch some counterattacks. On 8 July a German tank commanded by SS Unterscharführer Franz Staudegger met a group of about 50 T-34s. In the following battle Staudegger knocked out 22 T-34s; he was awarded the first Knights Cross for a Tiger commander. The German tanks' advance was slowed. On the 9 July the first German units reached the Psel River. The next day the first infantry units crossed the Psel. By 10 July German units in the south had lost 166 tanks. Despite the deep defensive system and minefields, German tank losses were remarkably low.The 11th of July was a successful day for German units; Armygroup Kempf achieved a breakthrough and the III Panzercorps penetrated deep into Russian lines. The next night the 6th Pz.Div took a bridge over the Donec with a coup de main (a swift attack using the element of surprise). Kempf's III Panzercorps advanced to Prokhorovka from the south and the II SS Panzercorps from the west, almost trapping the Russian 69th Army. At this moment Manstein thought he had achieved the final breakthrough and could now operate freely and destroy the Russian reserves.Meanwhile the Red Army planned a huge counterattack to destroy the spearheads of Heeresgruppe Süd (Army Group South). Accounts of this battle are controversial. The original Soviet account of a brave but reckless if ultimately successful mass Red Army assault on heavy German armour is now generally discounted; the most recent revisionist accounts suggest a Soviet debacle, with the Soviet charge on German armour being disrupted not by German tanks but because many T-34s fell into a Soviet anti-tank ditch. What is generally not disputed is that the Red Army did enough, at great cost, to stop a German breakthrough. In that sense this remains a crucial turning point of the battle and indeed of the Great Patriotic War: here the German army was stopped. On the morning of 12 July Hoth, determined to push for a breakthrough, collected reserves of the 4th Panzer Army and advanced on Prokhorovka. At the same time the 5th Guards Tank Army launched a series of attacks as part of multi-front counteroffensive in an attempt to catch the Germans off balance. The SS and Guards units collided west of Prokhorovka in country punctuated by farms, rolling hills and gullies. In stifling heat, an eight-hour battle began. The German units had 494 tanks and self-propelled artillery pieces in the attack, with 90% operational.The men of the 5th Guards Tank Army had not yet been committed to battle, so they were fresh. The German force found itself heavily outnumbered. After the battle was over, the Soviets held the area and were able to recover their disabled tanks and wounded crews. The battle can best be described as a costly tactical loss but an operational draw for the Red Army. Neither the 5th Guards Tank Army nor the II SS Panzer Corps accomplished their missions that day. The air battle was also intense; von Manstein had intended it to be the decisive blow against the Red Army forces, preventing a breakthrough to Oboyan and Kursk. The 5th Guards Tank Army had moved mainly at night, bringing 593 tanks and 37 self-propelled artillery pieces into position at Staryy Oskol.Sturmoviks from 291 ShAD attacked the II. SS Panzer Division throughout the day, causing significant damage to German armoured formations. Simultaneously, waves of Hs 129s and Ju 87s caused losses to the 69th Army and 5th Guards Army. Although Soviet tank losses are unknown, a report from the 29th Tank Corps reported "heavy losses in tanks through enemy aircraft and artillery". Losses were so heavy that the advance had to be halted and a switch to the defensive was ordered. The Luftwaffe had complete air superiority over Prokhorovka, due to the VVS being concentrated over the flanks of the 4th Panzers. The Soviet 31 Guard Tank Corps and the 33rd Guards Rifle Corps fought the II SS Totenkopf to a standstill by getting in close to the German armour and attacking the vulnerable sides of the Tigers. The II SS was soon forced onto the defensive. Although the German formation held, it lost 50 percent of its armour in a prolonged engagement. By the night of 11–12 July, the only success the Germans had to show for their losses was a captured bridgehead over the Donets river at Rzavets. The LSSAH had been stopped by the Soviet 18 Tank Corps; III Panzerkorps and Das Reich were checked by the 2nd Guards Tank Corps and two more Soviet reserve corps. Tank losses in the battle have been a contentious subject. Red Army losses have been given from 200 to 822 tanks but the loss records show about 300 complete losses, with a similar number damaged. German losses have been reported to be as low as 80 and as high as several hundred. This number is impossible to establish because of the German way of counting lost tanks. 60 to 70 German tanks are thought to have been total losses. While the German offensive had been stopped in the north by 10 July, in the south the overall situation still hung in the balance, even after 12 July. German forces on the southern wing, exhausted and heavily depleted, had breached the first two defensive belts and believed that they were about to break through the last belt. In fact at least five more defensive zones awaited them, although they were not as strong as the initial belts, and some of them did not have troops deployed. Red Army defenders had been weakened, and major parts of their reserve forces had been committed. Still, the available uncommitted Red Army reserves were far larger than the few available German reserves. On 16 July, German forces withdrew to their start line. Severely depleted, the Germans then had to face Operation Rumyantsev, an offensive launched to smash the German forces in the Belgorod-Kharkov area on 3 August. Belgorod fell on 5 August, and on 23 August, Kharkov fell, despite fierce resistance from German forces. With the capture of Kharkov, the Soviets considered the Battle of Kursk over.

5 July 1943	The Germans enact Operation Citadel - the assault on the Kursk salient. The operation begins at 4:30am but major elements are delayed until 5:00am thanks to intense artillery attacks by the prepared Russians.
6 July 1943	Soviet Marshal-General Rokossovsky and his Central Front army engage in a counter-attack against the German offensive. The counter-attack fails but is enough to slow the German 9th Army some. A measly 6 miles of territory is gained by the Germans.
7 July 1943	German General Hoth and his 4th Panzer Army move into the salient, covering some 20 miles of territory. Their advantage brings them near Pokrovka.
10 July 1943	Soviet resistance to the German offensives is so intense that German General Hoth is forced to bring up his reserves and commit them to the fight. The advancing Germans are slowed evermore by the stinky Soviet defenders, also made up of deadly anti-tank teams.
11 July 1943	Soviet generals Zhukov and Vassilevky are given total control of the actions in and around Kursk by Stalin himself. The Soviet Bryansk Front northeast of Kursk moves in on German General Model's 9th Army.
12 July 1943	The Soviets commit more tanks against Hoth and his 4th Panzer Army. A huge battle involving more than 1,000 tanks of the German and Soviet armies duke it out near Pokrovka. Soviet General Sokolosky moves against German Army Group Center and the 9th Army in a counter-offensive.
13 July 1943	Adolph Hitler orders an end to Operation Citadel.
15 July 1943	Fighting in the Kursk salient officially ends.
23 July 1943	German Army forces are pushed back to their original starting positions by this date.
3 August 1943	Soviet forces of the Steppe, Voronezh and South-West Fronts initiate a new offensive against German Army Group South just outside of the Kursk salient.
5 August 1943	Soviet Army forces move towards Kharkov, liberating the city of Belgorod in the process.
23 August 1943	Kharkov is retaken by the Soviet Army.