Erich Von Manstein

Von Manstein was born Fritz Erich von Lewinski in Berlin, the tenth child of a Prussian aristocrat, artillery general Eduard von Lewinski (1829–1906), and Helene von Sperling (1847–1910). Hedwig von Sperling (1852–1925), Helene's younger sister, married Lieutenant General Georg von Manstein (1844–1913). The couple were not able to have children, thus it was decided that this tenth, unborn child would be adopted by his uncle and aunt. When he was born, the Lewinskis sent a telegram to the von Mansteins which stated: You got a healthy boy today. Mother and child well. Congratulations. Not only were both Erich von Manstein's biological and adopted father Prussian generals, but his mother's brother and both his grandfathers had also been Prussian generals (one of them leading a corps in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71). In addition, he was closely related to Paul von Hindenburg, the future Generalfeldmarschall and President of Germany. Thus, his career in the Prussian army was assured from birth. He attended the Lycée in Strasbourg (1894–99), a territory which had been conquered by the German Empire after the Franco-Prussian War of 1870–71. He spent six years in the cadet corps (1900–1906), in Plön and Groß-Lichterfelde and joined the Third Foot Guards Regiment (Garde zu Fuß) in March 1906 as an ensign. He was promoted to Lieutenant in January 1907, and in October 1913, entered the Prussian War Academy. On August 18, 1939, in preparation for Operation Fall Weiß, the German invasion of Poland, von Manstein was appointed Chief of Staff to Gerd von Rundstedt’s Army Group South. Here he worked along with von Rundstedt’s Chief of Operations, Colonel Günther Blumentritt in the development of the operational plan. Von Rundstedt accepted von Manstein’s plan calling for the concentration of the majority of the army group’s armored units into Walther von Reichenau’s 10th Army, with the objective of a decisive breakthrough which would lead to the encirclement of Polish forces west of the Vistula River. In von Manstein’s plan, two other armies comprising Army Group South, Wilhelm List’s 14th Army and Johannes Blaskowitz’s 8th Army, were to provide the flank support for Reichenau’s armored thrust towards Warsaw, the Polish capital. Privately, von Manstein was lukewarm about the Polish campaign, thinking that it would be better to keep Poland as a buffer between Germany and the Soviet Union. He also worried about an Allied attack on the West Wall once the Polish campaign started, thus drawing Germany into a two-front war. Launched on September 1, 1939, the invasion began successfully. In Army Group South’s area of responsibility, armored units of the 10th Army pursued the retreating Poles, giving them no time to set up a defense. The 8th Army prevented the isolated Polish troop concentrations in Łódź, Radom and Poznań from merging into a cohesive force. Deviating from the original plan that called for heading straight for the Vistula and then proceeding to Warsaw, von Manstein persuaded von Rundstedt to encircle the Polish units in the Radom area. The plan succeeded, clearing the bulk of Polish resistance from the southern approach to Warsaw. On September 27, 1939, Warsaw formally surrendered, although isolated pockets of resistance remained. That same day, Hitler ordered the Army High Command, led by General Franz Halder, to develop a plan for action in the west against France and the Low Countries. The different plans that the General Staff suggested were given to von Manstein and his staff, who, with Gerd von Rundstedt's approval, formalized an alternative plan for Fall Gelb (Case Yellow ). This plan received Hitler's attention in February 1940 and finally his agreement. By late October, the bulk of the German Army was redeployed to the west. Von Manstein was made Chief of Staff of von Rundstedt’s Army Group A in western Germany. Like many of the army's younger officers, von Manstein opposed Fall Gelb, criticizing it for its lack of ability to deliver strategic results and the uninspired use of the armored forces, which may have come from OKH's inability to influence Hitler's planning. Von Manstein pointed out that a repeat of the Schlieffen Plan, with the attack directed through Belgium, was something the Allies expected, as they were already moving strong forces into the area. Bad weather in the area caused the attack to be canceled several times and eventually delayed into the spring. During the autumn, Von Manstein, with the informal cooperation of Heinz Guderian, developed his own plan; he suggested that the panzer divisions attack through the wooded hills of the Ardennes where no one would expect them, then establish bridgeheads on the Meuse River and rapidly drive to the English Channel. The Germans would thus cut off the French and Allied armies in Belgium and Flanders. Von Manstein's proposal also contained a second thrust, outflanking the Maginot Line, which would have allowed the Germans to force any future defensive line much further south. This second thrust would perhaps have avoided the need for the Fall Rot (Case Red ) second stage of the Battle of France (Von Manstein, 2004). The plan was after the event nicknamed Sichelschnitt (sickle cut). Oberkommando der Wehrmacht originally rejected the proposal. Halder had von Manstein removed from von Rundstedt's headquarters and sent to the east to command the 38th Army Corps. But Hitler, looking for a more aggressive plan, approved a modified version of von Manstein's ideas, which today is known as the Manstein Plan. This modified version, formulated by Halder, did not contain the second thrust. Von Manstein and his corps played a minor role during the operations in France, serving under Günther von Kluge's 4th Army. However, it was his corps which helped to achieve the first breakthrough during Fall Rot, east of Amiens, and was the first to reach and cross the River Seine. The invasion was an outstanding military success and von Manstein was promoted to full general and awarded the Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross for suggesting the plan. In February 1941, von Manstein was appointed commander of the 56th Panzer Corps. He became involved in Operation Barbarossa, serving under General Erich Hoepner. Attacking on June 22, 1941, von Manstein advanced more than 100 miles in only two days and seized two vital bridges over the Dvina River at Dvinsk. In September 1941, von Manstein was appointed commander of the 11th Army. Its previous commander, Colonel-General Eugen Ritter von Schobert, had perished when his plane landed in a Russian minefield. The 11th Army was tasked with invading the Crimea, capturing Sevastopol and pursuing enemy forces on the flank of Army Group South during its advance into Russia [Von Manstein, (2004)]. After the initial German breakthrough, the rest of the Perekop area had to be secured. After ten days of fighting, the Soviet line was overrun on 28 October. The Germans quickly seized control over the whole peninsula, and by 17 November, only the city of Sevastopol held out. The attack on Sevastopol began October 30, 1941 but failed and on December 21, just as the Germans were preparing for their last push, the Soviets launched a spoiling attack, forcing them back. Shortly thereafter the Soviet winter offensive began, producing the Wehrmacht's so-called "Winter Crisis". Just over a week later, on December 26, 1941, the Soviets landed on the Kerch straits, and on December 30, executed another landing near Theodosia. Only a hurried withdrawal from the Kerch straits, in contravention of Manstein's orders, by 46 Infantry Division under General Hans Graf von Sponecks command prevented a collapse of the eastern part of the Crimea, although the division lost most of its heavy equipment. This situation forced von Manstein to cancel a resumption of the attack on Sevastopol and send most of his forces east to destroy the Soviet bridgehead. The situation was stabilised by late April 1942. Operation Trappenjagd, launched on May 8, 1942, aimed at expelling the Russian forces from the Kerch peninsula. After feinting against the north, the 11th army attacked south, and the Soviets were soon reduced to fleeing for the Kerch straits. Three Soviet armies (44th, 47th, and 51st), 21 divisions, 176,000 men, 347 tanks, and nearly 3,500 guns were lost.The remains of the force were evacuated and Trappenjagd was completed successfully on 18 May. German losses were 3,397 men ( 600 KIA ) and 8 tanks. With months delay von Manstein turned his attention once more towards the capture of Sevastopol, a battle in which Germany would use some of the largest guns ever built. Along with large numbers of regular artillery pieces, super-heavy 600mm mortars and the 800mm "Dora" railway gun were brought in for the assault. The furious barrage began on the morning of June 7, 1942, and all of the resources of the Luftwaffe's Luftflotte 4, commanded by Wolfram von Richthofen, descended on their targets, continuing for five days before the main assault began. The outer defensive rings were breached by June 16, 1942, and on July 4, 1942 Sevastopol fell. Hitler, delighted at hearing the good news, phoned von Manstein and commended him as "The Conqueror of Sevastopol", informing him that he had ordered von Manstein's promotion to Generalfeldmarschall. After the capture of Sevastopol the German high command felt that any city could be taken with a determined enough attack,and von Manstein was seen as the right man to finally break Leningrad, which had been under siege from autumn the previous year. Von Manstein, with elements of the 11th Army, was transferred to the Leningrad front to lead Operation Nordlicht, which was hoped to be the final capture of the city, set to launch on September 15, 1942. Hitler was confident that with considerable amounts of artillery and the new Tiger tank this operation would finally break the determined Soviet defense; von Manstein, on the other hand, was more pessimistic, arguing that a simultaneous attack in the north by the Finns would be needed. On August 27, 1942 the Soviets launched a spoiling attack against Georg Lindemann’s 18th Army in the narrow German salient west of Lake Ladoga. Von Manstein was forced to divert his forces in order to avoid catastrophe. A series of bitter battles ensued, in which von Manstein's smaller forces managed to outmaneuver the larger Soviet forces, which lost over 60,000 men over the course of the next few months. This meant, however, that the Germans were not able to execute a decisive assault on Leningrad, and the siege continued into 1943. On November 21, 1942, during the Battle of Stalingrad, Adolf Hitler appointed von Manstein commander of the newly created Army Group Don (Heeresgruppe Don), consisting of a hastily assembled group of tired men and machines, and ordered him to lead Operation Wintergewitter (Winter Storm), the rescue effort by Hermann Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and auxiliary Romanian troops to relieve the 6th Army of Friedrich Paulus trapped inside Stalingrad. Wintergewitter, launched on December 12, achieved some initial success and von Manstein got his three panzer divisions and supporting units of the 57th Panzer Corps (comprising the 23rd Panzer Grenadier Division, and the 6th and 17th Panzer Divisions) within 30 miles of Stalingrad by December 20. However, the corps was halted at the town of Aksay, and strong Russian forces eventually pushed them back. At this point, von Manstein recommended Paulus to break out of the city, despite Hitler's refusal to allow a break out attempt. Erich von Manstein did however not dare to give the break out order himself, even though he could have, since he was Paulus's superior.[5] Operation Saturn, a massive Red Army offensive in the southernmost part of the front, aimed at capturing Rostov and thus cutting off the German Army Group A, which was still withdrawing from the Caucasus, forced von Manstein to divert his forces to help hard-pressed Army Group A, in its retreat to Ukraine, thus avoiding the collapse of the entire front. The attack also prevented the 48th Panzer Corps (comprising the 336th Infantry Division, the 3rd Luftwaffe Field Division, and the 11th Panzer Division), under the command of General Otto von Knobelsdorff, from joining up with the 57th Panzer Corps as planned. Instead, the 48th Panzer Corps held a line along the River Chir, beating off successive Russian attacks. General Hermann Balck used the 11th Panzer Division to counterattack Russian salients. But the Romanian, Italian, and Hungarian armies on the flanks were overwhelmed, and the 48th Panzer Corps was forced to retreat. As a result, the remnants of the 4th Panzer Army retreated, as its northern flank was exposed by the loss of the Don. By early February, the German forces began to regroup. Von Manstein's Army Group Don combined with Army Group B and was made into the new Army Group South (Heeresgruppe Süd), which was led by von Manstein. On February 21, 1943, he launched a counteroffensive into the overextended Soviet flank. The assault proved a major success; von Manstein's troops advanced rapidly, isolating Soviet forward units and forcing the Red Army to halt most of its offensive operations. By March 2, tank spearheads from Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and Army Detachment Kempf met, cutting off large portions of the Soviet Southwest Front, and by March 9, the Wehrmacht had inflicted a heavy defeat on the Soviets at Krasnograd and Barvenkovo. An estimated 23,000 Soviet soldiers were killed and a further 9,000 were captured. Additionally, 615 Soviet tanks and 354 guns were captured.[citation needed] Von Manstein then pushed forward, his effort spearheaded by Paul Hausser's 2nd SS Panzer Corps, recapturing Kharkov on March 14, after bloody street fighting in what is known as the Third Battle of Kharkov. In recognition for this accomplishment, von Manstein received the Oak Leaves for the Knight's Cross. The 2nd SS Panzer Corps then captured Belgorod on March 21. Von Manstein proposed a daring action for the summer nicknamed the "backhand blow", which was intended to outflank the Red Army into the Sea of Azov at Rostov, but Hitler instead chose the more conventional Operation Citadel aimed at crushing the Kursk salient. During Operation Citadel, von Manstein led the southern pincer, and despite losses, he managed to achieve most of his initial goals, inflicting far more casualties than he sustained. In his memoirs, Marshal Georgy Zhukov, who led the Soviet defense at Kursk, praised von Manstein. But due to the almost complete failure of the northern sector's pincer led by Günther von Kluge and Walther Model, chronic lack of infantry support and an operational reserve, as well as Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of Sicily, Hitler called off the offensive. Von Manstein protested, asserting that the victory was almost at hand as he felt he had achieved local superiority, and that with a little more effort, he could crack the Soviet defenses before they could bring up their reserves. After the failure of Citadel, the Soviets launched a massive counterattack against the exhausted German forces. A German victory in the sense of annihilating the surrounded Soviet forces required both the completion of the encirclement (that is the linking of the northern and southern German pincers) and holding the encirclement long enough to overcome the encircled Soviet forces. Even if the first had been accomplished it does not follow that the second would automatically follow. The German forces post-Stalingrad were never able to force the Soviets into significant retreats, except for temporary reversals like Kharkov. After halting the German offensive at Kursk, the Soviets had enough strength to launch immediate counterattacks. In September 1943, von Manstein withdrew to the west bank of the river Dnieper, inflicting heavy casualties on the Red Army From October to mid-January 1944, von Manstein stabilized the situation on the South Front. However, the Soviets established a salient from Kiev, and were within reach of the crucial town of Zhitomir. The Germans launched a successful counteroffensive, in which 1st SS Division Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler and 2nd SS Division Das Reich, together with 1st, 7th, 19th, and 25th Panzer Divisions and 68th Infantry Division (part of 4th Panzer Army), wheeled around the flank of the Russians in front of Zhitomir. Several notable victories were won at Brussilov, Radomyshl, and Meleni, under the guidance of General Hermann Balck. Balck and his chief of staff had wanted to attack the base of the salient and go for Kiev, but General Raus favored a more prudent approach.In late January 1944, von Manstein was forced to retreat further westwards by the Soviet offensive. In mid-February 1944, he disobeyed Hitler's order and ordered 11th and 42nd Corps (consisting of 56,000 men in six divisions) of Army Group South to break out from the "Korsun Pocket", which occurred on February 16–17, 1944. Eventually, Hitler accepted this action and ordered the breakout after it had already taken place. Von Manstein continued to argue with Hitler about overall strategy on the Eastern Front. Von Manstein advocated an elastic, mobile defense. He was prepared to cede territory, attempting to make the Soviet forces either stretch out too thinly or to make them advance too fast so that they could be attacked on the flanks with the goal of encircling them. Hitler ignored Manstein's advice and continued to insist on static warfare. Because of these frequent disagreements, von Manstein publicly advocated that Hitler relinquish control and leave the management of the war to professionals, starting with the establishment of the position of commander-in-chief in the East (Oberbefehlshaber Ost). Hitler, however, rejected this idea numerous times, fearing that it would weaken his hold on power. This argument also alarmed some of Hitler's closest henchmen, such as Göring and the SS chief Himmler, who were not prepared to give up any of their powers. Himmler started to question von Manstein's loyalty openly and insinuated that he was a defeatist unsuitable to command troops. Von Manstein's frequent arguing combined with these allegations resulted in Hitler relieving von Manstein of his command in March 1944. Instead, on April 2, 1944, Hitler appointed Walther Model, a firm supporter, as commander of Army Group South. Nevertheless, von Manstein received the Swords for his Knight's Cross, the third highest German military honour. After his dismissal, Von Manstein entered an eye clinic in Breslau, recuperated near Dresden and then retired. Although he did not take part in the attempt to kill Hitler in July 1944, he had been contacted by Henning von Tresckow and others in 1943 about the plot. While von Manstein did agree that change was necessary, he refused to join them as he still considered himself bound by duty. (He rejected the approaches with the statement "Preussische Feldmarschälle meutern nicht" – "Prussian Field Marshals do not mutiny.") He also feared that a civil war would ensue. Though he didn't join the plotters, he did not betray them either. In late January 1945, he collected his family from their homes in Liegnitz and evacuated them to western Germany. He surrendered to British Field Marshal Montgomery and was arrested by British troops on August 23, 1945. Manstein was found guilty and he was sentenced on 24th February 1950 to 18 years imprisonment. However, for medical reasons he was freed on 6th May 1953. His war memoirs, Lost Victories, was published in Germany in 1955. Erich von Manstein died on 11th June 1973.